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Abstract:
Data privacy is a life-or-death matter for public health. Beginning in late fall
2019, two series of events unfolded, one everyone talked about and one hardly
anyone noticed: The greatest world-health crisis in at least 100 years, the
COVID-19 pandemic; and the development of the Personal Data Protection Act
Committee by the Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) in the United States. By
July 2021, each of these stories had reached a turning point. In the developed,
Western world, most people who wanted to receive the vaccine against COVID19 could do so. Meanwhile, the ULC adopted the Uniform Personal Data
Protection Act (UPDPA) at its annual meeting, paving the way for state
legislatures to adopt it beginning in 2022. It has so far been introduced in three
jurisdictions.
These stories intersect in public health. Public health researchers struggled
with COVID-19 in the United States because they lacked information about
individuals who were exposed, among other matters. Understanding other public
health threats (e.g., obesity, opioid abuse, racism) also requires linking diverse
data on contributing social, environmental, and economic factors. The UPDPA
removes some barriers to public health practice and research resulting from the
lack of comprehensive federal privacy laws. Its full potential, however, can be
achieved only with involvement of public health researchers and professionals.
This article analyzes the UPDPA and other comprehensive state privacy statutes,
noting the ways that they could promote—and hinder—public health. It
concludes with recommendations for public health researchers and professionals
to get involved in upcoming legislative debates on data privacy. Lives will
depend on the outcomes.
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DATA PRIVACY IN THE TIME OF PLAGUE

INTRODUCTION
It is a commonplace and a cliché in legal scholarship and the broader culture
that American data privacy laws are a “patchwork” of solutions to discrete
privacy issues that leave significant gaps and open questions about which
personal data are subject to protection and to what extent.1 There is no blanket of
privacy law that covers all subjects, types, and users of data. Patches cover some,
overlapping in some cases with each other, but in other cases leaving large parts
of the body of data uncovered.2 One impetus for this Article grows from a series
of events in 2021 that respond to this patchwork: Adoption by Virginia and
Colorado of comprehensive data privacy legislation and approval by the Uniform
Law Commissioners (ULC)3 of the Uniform Personal Data Protection Act
(UPDPA).4 These developments occurred against the backdrop of significant
changes to California’s 2018 comprehensive privacy act resulting from a 2020
referendum. This Article is the first to our knowledge to critically assess the
1 E.g., Thorin Klosowski, The State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the US (And Why It
Matters), N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/state-of-privacylaws-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/RG26-2CPC] (“The United States doesn’t have a singular law that
covers the privacy of all types of data. Instead, it has a mix of laws that go by acronyms and
initialisms like HIPAA, FCRA, FERPA, GLBA, ECPA, COPPA, and VPPA”); Brouse McDowell,
Craig S. Horbus & Jarman J. Smith, Corporate TIPS: U.S. Data Privacy Law Patchwork Grows as
States
Enact
New
Legislation,
LEXOLOGY
(Aug.
18,
2021),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e24fedac-cea7-412a-a5eb-5d736276e8d6
[https://perma.cc/RLQ2-J4GE]; Natasha Singer, An American Quilt of Privacy Laws, Incomplete,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/in-privacy-laws-anincomplete-american-quilt.html [https://perma.cc/G4UU-DLMZ]; Anthony Jones, Autonomous
Cars: Navigating the Patchwork of Data Privacy Laws That Could Impact the Industry, 25 CATH.
U.J.L. & TECH. 180 (2017); Kiran K. Jeevanjee, Nice Thought, Poor Execution: Why the Dormant
Commerce Clause Precludes California’s CCPA from Setting National Privacy Law, 70 AM. U. L.
REV. F. 75 (2020); Stephanie Comstock Ondrof, “Senator, We Run Ads”: Advocating for a US SelfRegulatory Response to the EU General Data Protection Regulation, 28 GEO. MASON L. REV. 815,
819 (2021). The reporters for the American Law Institute describe it instead as an “interrelated
amalgam of different types of law,” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF DATA PRIVACY § 1 (AM. L. INST.
2019) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY], as “a complex aggregation of overlapping and
inconsistent laws that represent an increasingly significant compliance burden,” and as “sectoral,”
contrasting with “omnibus” regulatory regimes. Id. § 1, cmt. e. (We use “comprehensive” below to
refer to “omnibus” regimes.) The reporters for ALI’s initiative were leading data-privacy scholars
Professors Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove. Id. at vii.
2 See infra text accompanying note 85.
3 The group is also known the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. About Us, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview
[https://perma.cc/HD2M-PCDW] (last visited Sept. 14, 2021).
4 Consumer Data Protection Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to 59.1-585 (2021) (effective
Jan. 1, 2023) [hereinafter VCDPA]; Colorado Privacy Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-104 to 110, 61-1301 to 1313 (2021) (effective July 1, 2023) [hereinafter CPA] UNIF. PERS. DATA PROT. ACT
(Unif. L. Comm’n 2021) [hereinafter UPDPA]; see also California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) [hereinafter CCPA].
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UPDPA and the adopted comprehensive acts in California, Virginia, and
Colorado—which we refer to as the “CAVACO statutes”—side by side. This
analysis is timely, as the UPDPA has already been introduced in three U.S.
jurisdictions as of February 2022 and may prove an influential model for state
privacy law.
Personal data also play a critical role in public health interventions and
research, and a second impetus for this Article grows from public health crises
that have rocked the United States in 2020–21 and the need for researchers to
have access to so-called “big data” to address these crises. Talk of COVID-19
has been ubiquitous in the media, of course, but a second set of newsworthy
events highlights other equally pernicious public health crises: racism and health
risks associated with the poverty that disproportionately afflicts persons of color
in the United States. Furthermore, media coverage of these crises has
overshadowed other persistent and growing public health threats, like obesity,
opioid abuse, homelessness, climate change, and mental health. These crises
plague America, and data privacy legislation holds the potential to make
ameliorating them less—or more—difficult.
As a preliminary matter, data protection laws raise particular concerns for
promoting public health. Readers might wonder why these statutes are of concern
to public health researchers and professionals. After all, many public health
agencies are arms of local and state governments, and the UPDPA and the
CAVACO statutes exclude government agencies from their coverage. The point
is well taken, but it does nothing to allay concerns of public health researchers
who may be affiliated with private institutions. Furthermore, the key challenge
here relates to “secondary uses.” Primary uses are those that permit us to live in
the digital world, the very uses for which the data are collected. Secondary uses
are those where data are collected for one purpose and reused for a different
purpose, particularly where private entities gather data for business purposes and
public health researchers and practitioners seek access to those data for public
health purposes.
There are various ways that personal data—not just health data—can be used
to improve public health.5 Of course, there is research for scientific purposes.
University and non-profit researchers want data to understand if two things are
related; for example, whether a public-health initiative—perhaps a “nudge” for
consumers to choose to donate their organs6—is effective at achieving its goals.
They also want to learn about how the world works; how poverty and racism
relate to disease, for example. Research based on secondary use of existing data
is much cheaper than research that requires collecting new data from individuals,
5 For more details, see Part I(A).
6 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 254 (Final ed. 2021).
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and it permits using sizable longitudinal datasets accumulated over time. In
addition, some research is not possible without re-using existing data.
Researchers and public health professionals can also make secondary use of
aggregated data to promote population health and well-being. For example,
personal data about health diagnoses and outcomes can be linked to other data to
understand the cause of injuries, diseases, or poor health and to help officials
develop prevention strategies.
Personal data can also be used for interventions that seem less benign. For
example, an employer could use data about employees to change their health
insurance premiums based on whether the employees have been vaccinated
against a disease.7 The government could use contact-tracing information
regarding a pandemic illness to identify carriers and potential carriers and impose
isolation or quarantine orders.8 As we explain below, these examples highlight
differences between using data for what is often called “human subjects
research” and for public health interventions. The Common Rule, the regulations
for research using human subjects, which is supported by twenty federal
agencies, governs research on human subjects in many settings.9 An Institutional
Review Board (IRB) that “has been formally designated to review and monitor”
research generally supervises such research projects.10
The UPDPA and the other state acts apply to most such secondary data
practices, so understanding how they do so is critical. They may have an
especially significant potential to affect the use of personal data for public health
interventions and research. For that reason, an evaluation of the UPDPA and the
7 Niraj Chokshi, Margot Sanger-Katz & Tara Siegel Bernard, Delta’s Extra $200 Insurance
Fee Shows Vaccine Dilemma for Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/business/delta-insurance-fee-unvaccinated.html
[https://perma.cc/ZY8B-7ECT].
8 See Frequently Asked Questions: Contact Tracing, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/faq.html#:~:text=Discussions%20with%20health%20department%20staff,or%20local%20hea
lth%20department [https://perma.cc/8JZN-MAZX] (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
9 Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to
be codified at 6 C.F.R. Part 46 and several other points) [hereinafter Common Rule]. The Federal
Food and Drug Administration regulations that govern human subjects research are also highly
similar to the Common Rule regulations. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2020).
10 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and Protection of Human
Subjects in Clinical Trials (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drug-evaluationand-research-cder/institutional-review-boards-irbs-and-protection-human-subjects-clinical-trials
[https://perma.cc/GFU5-AJPZ]. Universities and similar research institutions typically have their
own IRBs and subject most of their research to their supervision. See, e.g., Committee on the Use
of Human Subjects, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, https://cuhs.harvard.edu/ [https://perma.cc/67AR2M69] (last visited Feb. 12, 2022); Institutional Review Boards (IRBMED), U. OF MICH. MED.
SCH.,
https://research.medicine.umich.edu/our-units/institutional-review-boards-irbmed
[https://perma.cc/XQJ2-B8CH] (last visited Feb. 12, 2022).
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other state comprehensive acts from the perspective of public health is
particularly important now. To our knowledge, this Article is the first to closely
examine the effect on public health of any state comprehensive privacy statute,
including California’s now-four-year-old law.
Part I introduces the present landscape in public health and U.S. data
protection law, considering both the existing laws and some proposals for
reorganizing and reimagining the privacy paradigm within American law. We
explain why we focus the balance of this Article on the “notice and choice”
paradigm that is evident in the existing legislation. Our position is that an ethics
of data privacy should focus on the autonomy of data subjects, their ability to
know of and consent to data practices to which their personal data are subjected.
At the same time, given that certain “defaults” are at play in modern consent
processes—click-through privacy policies and the like—regulators should
establish consent defaults that favor some secondary uses of personal data in line
with public interests and preferences, uses that minimize social harms and
maximize community benefits, including uses for public health and research.
Part II provides a conceptual framework for data protection law in the
“notice and choice” paradigm. It defines terms and identifies important
characteristics of any data-protection regime, providing an extension of existing
conceptual frameworks, such as the American Law Institute’s Principles of the
Law of Data Privacy.11 Part II analyzes the UPDPA and CAVACO statutes using
this conceptual framework. The detailed analysis is essential for privacy-law
theorists, legislators, and groups interested in proposed privacy legislation that is
being deliberated today.12
Part III assesses the UPDPA and CAVACO statutes against the normative
frameworks previously discussed and recommends ways in which public health
researchers and professionals may wish to intervene in coming months and years
in the deliberations on data protection statutes. As Table 1 shows, the Colorado
Privacy Act is the most supportive of public health practices and research,
exempting a wide swath of them from its coverage and permitting most others
without the necessity of disclosing them to data subjects. Some ethicists might go
as far as to say it is too friendly to public health because of this lack of
disclosure, and we’d agree. The California Consumer Privacy Act broadly
supports research, but generally requires that those collecting data from
consumers for public health activities, like public health surveillance and
interventions, must disclose the practices and give data subjects the chance to opt
out. This most closely fits the normative frameworks we outline below. The
11 PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1.
12 Part II cannot claim, however, to provide a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of these
acts.
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UPDPA raises a concern regarding the need for data subjects to opt in for uses of
sensitive personal data—the kind of data often at issue in public health practices
and research. Finally, the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act requires
consumers to opt in for almost all public health data practices, which could
gravely impair public health activities subject to that act. We propose that public
health researchers and professionals should seek to amend the Colorado and
Virginia acts and should seek to revise the UPDPA as it is adopted in states to
conform them to the normative frameworks we provide. We offer other
suggestions as well.
In theory, a comprehensive privacy law is a smooth blanket, covering all
circumstances while permitting appropriate socially desirable and beneficial uses,
like those for research and public health. Our review of the UPDPA and
CAVACO statutes shows that they do privilege some public health activities,
particularly generalizable research, but that public health professionals must
involve themselves actively in legislative and regulatory activity surrounding
future adoption of such acts to improve them and to ensure that legislators and
regulators do not forget public health in their rush to protect private data. A
comprehensive data protection framework should provide a protective blanket
unmarred by patchwork holes—not merely a sheet to cover the bodies of the
dead.
I.

THE CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC HEALTH AND LEGAL LANDSCAPES

Analyzing and evaluating the UPDPA and the CAVACO statutes requires
some background in the public health and legal landscapes in the United States.
This includes a basic understanding of public health practices, an overview of
U.S. data privacy and protection law, and a discussion of normative concerns at
the boundaries of these two disciplines.
A. Public Health Research and Practices
Public health, as both a science and a practice, is data driven. Data inform
epidemiologists about the nature of disease and conditions that affect health.
These data can help public health practitioners understand whether a disease
spreads through air, touch, bodily fluids, animal contact, or consumption of
tainted food.13 Data can also help build an understanding of how social and
environmental factors—such as walkable communities, food deserts,
13 See J.A. Magnuson et al., Informatics in Disease Prevention and Epidemiology, in PUBLIC
DISEASE HEALTH INFORMATICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 239, 239–57 (J.A. Magnuson & Brian
E. Dixon, eds., 3d ed. 2020), https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-41215-9_14
[https://perma.cc/BKU5-BPX4] (describing public health informatics and disease investigation
generally).
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environmental contamination, economic inequities, and structural racism—affect
health.14 We can divide the activities that use these data into public health
research, which seeks generalized knowledge; surveillance, which monitors
health data to enable and assess interventions; community interventions or health
programs designed to improve population health; and individual interventions,
intended to serve at-risk individuals or protect the rest of the population from
them.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the limitations of the traditional public
health system, as it was unable to acquire, ingest, and share the unprecedented
volumes of data needed to understand and control a rapidly spreading virus.15
1.

Public Health Research

The field of public health is grounded in scientific evidence. This body of
evidence includes, but is not limited to, microbiology, physiology, sociology, and
policy research.16 Public health research aims to generalize the results from a
14 Sandro Galea et al., Estimated Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the United States,
101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1456, 1462–63 (2011) (estimating hundreds of thousands of deaths
associated with non-biological factors, including education, racism, and economic inequity); see
also Paula Braveman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants of Health: It’s Time to Consider
the Causes of the Causes, 129 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 19, 27 (2014) (describing the difficulty obtaining
the cross-sectoral data needed to study social determinants of health).
15 See generally Willem G van Panhuis et al., A Systematic Review of Barriers to Data
Sharing in Public Health, 14 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1144 (2014); Drew Armstrong, Data Failures
Keep the CDC From Seeing the Whole Picture on COVID, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-21/cdc-public-health-data-failures-mean-u-slacks-whole-picture-on-covid [https://perma.cc/5LQS-ASVH]; Xenia Shih Bion, Crumbling Data
Infrastructure Undermines Nation’s Pandemic Reponse, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. BLOG,
https://www.chcf.org/blog/crumbling-data-infrastructure-undermines-nations-pandemic-response/
[https://perma.cc/ 42G3-NPXT] (last visited Apr. 11, 2022). Many of these deficiencies are due to
the three challenges in the U.S. public health system. First, public health in the United States is
chronically underfunded, particularly after state and local budget cuts following the 2008 Great
Recession. Second, the decentralized U.S. public health system—a product of the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution—imposes legal, political, and relationship barriers between local,
state, and federal public health partners seeking to share public health information. See generally
Panhuis et al., supra. Third, many available data that are relevant to public health are subject to
restrictive data protection laws. See generally Rachel Hulkower, Matthew Penn & Cason Schmit,
Privacy and Confidentiality of Public Health Information, in PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS AND
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 147 (J.A. Magnuson & Brian E. Dixon eds., 3d ed. 2020). However, a
comprehensive overview of the challenges facing public health informatics and public health data
systems is beyond the scope of this work.
16 See generally PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (J.A. Magnuson &
B.E. Dixon eds., 3d ed. 2020); Evan Anderson et al., Measuring Statutory Law and Regulations for
Empirical Research, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW RESEARCH: THEORY AND METHODS 237 (A. C. Wagenaar
& S. Burris eds., 1st ed. 2013); see PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS, supra, at 71–73; Braveman &
Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 27.
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discrete study sample in a specified period in time to a broader population.17 This
is in contrast to the practice of public health, which involves ongoing efforts to
monitor an entire community or population.18 Public health research includes
studies that require data collection (e.g., surveys, environmental sample
collection) as well as studies that rely on pre-existing data (e.g., electronic health
records).19 Whenever public health research uses data from identifiable human
data subjects, the Common Rule regulations protecting human subjects research
will likely apply.20
2.

Surveillance

There are several different types of public health surveillance that help
public health professionals understand the threats to population health. Unlike
health research, public health surveillance is “the ongoing, systematic collection,
analysis, and interpretation of health-related data essential to planning,
implementation, and evaluation of public health practice.”21 Critically, the
ongoing surveillance data-collection activities ensure that public health
professionals have current data to inform public health activities. For example,
healthcare providers are required by law to report if a patient has one or more
conditions of public health concern.22 These case reports assist public health
professionals to understand where a disease is spreading within a community.
Importantly, these ongoing surveillance activities are not research under the
Common Rule, so public health agencies can swiftly collect data and respond to
public health threats within their statutory capacity without additional regulatory
burdens.23 Consequently, this surveillance information provides critical
situational awareness required for deploying scarce public health resources
17 James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Practice vs. Research, COUNCIL OF
STATE & TERRITORIAL EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, May 24, 2004, at 14–20.
18 Id. at 14–21.
19 H. M. Xu et al., Lead Concentrations in Fine Particulate Matter After the Phasing Out of
Leaded Gasoline in Xi’an, China, 47 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 217, 219–22 (2012) (describing an
observed decrease in environmental lead concentrations associated with a decrease in the use of
leaded gasoline); Tara I. Chang & Wolfgang C. Winkelmayer, Comparative Effectiveness
Research: What Is It and Why Do We Need It in Nephrology, 27 NEPHROLOGY, DIALYSIS,
TRANSPLANT 2156, 2156–60 (2012) (providing an overview of comparative effectiveness research,
which often relies on electronic health records to evaluate the comparative health outcomes
associated with different treatment options).
20 See supra Introduction; Common Rule, supra note 9.
21 Introduction to Public Health Surveillance, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov/training/publichealth101/surveillance.html
[https://perma.cc/65PT-CXVL]
(last visited Oct. 5, 2021) (emphasis added).
22 Public health reporting is typically required by state law and requirements can vary
substantively by jurisdiction. See, e.g., N.M. CODE R. § 7.4.3 (LexisNexis 2021).
23 Hodge & Gostin, supra note 17.
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efficiently and effectively.24
In addition to acute public health threats, social, economic, and
environmental factors may have a far greater impact on an individual’s health
than biological factors.25 Public health professionals often have access to
aggregate data on these factors (e.g., census data), but data records or personlevel data—the type needed to link datasets and understand complex problems—
are far more difficult to obtain.26 Data on these social, economic, and
environmental factors are nevertheless often abundant in commercial datasets,
including data useful to market products and services or to determine things like
loan eligibility.27 Businesses sharing data about social, economic, and
environmental factors with public health agencies is a promising but largely
unexplored opportunity to better understand threats to public health, and by
extension, develop viable interventions to address those threats.28
3.

Public Health Programs and Population Interventions

Public health practice involves collective actions that assure the conditions
for people to be healthy.29 These actions, whether an ongoing program or new
intervention, rely on data to ensure that scarce resources are used efficiently.
Consequently, public health programs and interventions require data in the
planning phase to determine the most effective deployment of limited resources;
they require data throughout implementation to ensure activities are proceeding
as intended; and they require data to evaluate whether, and to what extent, the
24 For example, syndromic surveillance systems can detect symptom-based anomalies in local
emergency rooms that can provide public health departments with rapid information of emerging
infectious disease (e.g., influenza, anthrax). See Deborah W. Gould et al., The Evolution of
BioSense: Lessons Learned and Future Directions, 132 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 7S, 7S–10S (2017); see
also Matthias Linden et al., Case Numbers Beyond Contact Tracing Capacity Are Endangering the
Containment of COVID-19, 117 DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INT’L 790, 790–91 (2020) (describing the
capacity limitations that hindered the public health response to COVID-19).
25 See generally Galea et al., supra note 14, at 1462–63.
26 Braveman & Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 27.
27 See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2016); Id. at 68–83, 141–
60 (describing the often discriminatory and destructive ways that data are used that nonetheless
may be profitable to companies).
28 Mattia Prosperi et al., Big Data Hurdles in Precision Medicine and Precision Public
Health, BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 1, 5-10 (Dec. 29, 2018); Sonja A.
Rasmussen et al., Precision Public Health as a Key Tool in the COVID-19 Response, 324 JAMA
933, 934 (2020); Cason Schmit et al., Cross Sector Data Sharing: Necessity, Challenge, and Hope,
47 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 83, 83 (2019); Braveman & Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 27.
29 This reflects the Institute of Medicine’s definition of public health: “Public health is what
we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy.” INST.
MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1988). The definition implies a distinction between public
health and healthcare. The former focuses on prevention and maintenance of health, the latter treats
and mitigates existing ill health.
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program or intervention is achieving population health benefits.30
For example, during the early deployment of the COVID-19 vaccinations,
public health agencies relied on data to determine the most vulnerable subpopulations and used that data (in some cases) to deploy vaccines and set up
vaccination sites.31 Throughout vaccination deployment, public health agencies
collected data to determine whether the clinics were indeed serving those
vulnerable populations,32 adjusting strategies as necessary.33 Finally, public
health agencies closely monitored case reports and hospital and mortality data to
determine whether the vaccinations were affecting the spread of COVID-19 and
its health outcomes.34
Increasingly, public health agencies are exploring and leveraging nontraditional public health data to inform population-based interventions.
Traditional public health data include mandated case reports of infectious disease
(e.g., drug-resistant tuberculosis, HIV), vital statistics, reports of foodborne
illness, and other surveillance data.35 The New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene, however, developed a program that scanned publicly
available restaurant reviews—like those on Yelp!—for evidence of foodborne
illness (e.g., “food made me sick”).36 Using big-data analytics, public health
30 James Aspevig, Project Management and Public Health Informatics, PUBLIC HEALTH
INFORMATICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 211, 221–35 (J.A. Magnuson & Paul C. Fu, Jr. eds.,
2014); see also CASON SCHMIT, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND POLICY INNOVATIONS: SOCIAL IMPACT
BONDS 2–3, and generally (2014).
31 Ensuring Equity in COVID-19 Vaccine Distribution, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://www.hrsa.gov/coronavirus/health-center-program
[https://perma.cc/P6ZL-L77K]
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2021).
32 As opposed to merely reaching “vaccine tourists.” See Claire Gillespie, What is Vaccine
Tourism, and Is It Legal? Here’s What You Need to Know, HEALTH (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://www.health.com/condition/infectious-diseases/coronavirus/what-is-vaccine-tourism
[https://perma.cc/VWW3-KQBM] (“Vaccine tourism means visiting another country or state to get
a vaccine not available to you at home.”).
33 Strategies to Engage Communities Most Vulnerable to Covid-19, NAT’L ACADS. SCIS.
ENG’G
MED.,
https://www.nap.edu/resource/26068/interactive/vulnerable-communities.html
[https://perma.cc/8UHH-DLZT] (last visited Oct. 7, 2021); see also Megan Cerullo, State Vaccine
Incentives Do Little to Boost Vaccination Rates, Research Shows, CBS NEWS (Sep. 8, 2021),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/statewide-vaccine-incentives-lotteries-do-not-boost-vaccinationrates/ [https://perma.cc/UVD9-WU5X] (describing evaluations of vaccine incentives).
34 Dvir Aran, Estimating real-world COVID-19 Vaccine Effectiveness in Israel Using
Aggregated
Counts
1–6
(medRxiv,
Working
Paper,
2021),
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.02.05.21251139v3.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8C7-FGB4].
35 John R. Lumpkin & J.A. Magnuson, History of Public Health Information Systems and
Informatics, in PUBLIC HEALTH INFORMATICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 17–29 (J.A. Magnuson &
Paul C. Fu, Jr. eds., 2014).
36 See generally Cassandra Harrison et al., Using Online Reviews by Restaurant Patrons to
Identify Unreported Cases of Foodborne Illness—New York City, 2012-2013, 441 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 63 (2014); Elaine O. Nsoesie, Online Reports of Foodborne Illness
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professionals were able to identify previously unreported outbreaks.37 With this
information, they were able to focus their limited enforcement budget only on
highly probable events.
4.

Individual-based Interventions

Prevention is a central focus for public health practitioners. Preventing
adverse health outcomes—as opposed to treating those that develop—is often
less expensive and leads to better population health.38 While prevention efforts
can target entire communities, such as building sidewalks to promote active
living, many preventative interventions require identifying at-risk individuals
who stand to benefit the most.39
For example, maternal and child health is a critical ongoing public health
issue. Prenatal contact with expectant mothers can have a tremendously
beneficial effect on birth outcomes and maternal health.40 Moreover, the benefits
can extend far into a family’s future.41 In commercial settings, advanced data
analytics can predict whether a customer is pregnant based on changes to
purchasing behavior.42 These predictions are immensely valuable to companies
seeking to gain loyal customers at a point when purchasing behavior will change
substantially.43 For public health, this predictive ability can help direct scarce
Capture Foods Implicated in Official Foodborne Outbreak Reports, 67 PREVENTATIVE MED. 264–
69 (Aug. 11, 2014).
37 Harrison et al., supra note 36.
38 See generally Thomas R. Frieden, A Framework for Public Health Action: The Health
Impact Pyramid, 100(4) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 590 (2010).
39 See Karen A. Monsen et al., Public Health Nurses Tailor Interventions for Families at
Risk, 28 PUB. HEALTH NURSING 119, 119–21 (Mar.–Apr. 2011); see generally R. J. Donovan et al.,
TARPARE: A Method for Selecting Target Audiences for Public Health Interventions, 23-3 AUSTL.
& N.Z. J. PUB. HEALTH 280 (June 23, 1999).
40 In some cases, the benefits of prevention can be leveraged to support profitable
investments. See ASS’N STATE AND TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, FINANCING PUBLIC HEALTH
INTERVENTIONS THROUGH PAY FOR SUCCESS (2017) https://opioidspreparedness.org/HealthSystems-Transformation/Pay-for-Success-South-Carolina-Issue-Brief/
[https://perma.cc/UKZ4629Y].
41 Id.; Monsen et al., supra note 39.
42 Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her Father Did,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/howtarget-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/?sh=a82d6c66686d
[https://perma.cc/7GP4-NS3T].
43 Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012)
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html
[https://perma.cc/Z5HUVFC8]. Importantly, the scarcity of resources for public health interventions is a substantial
limitation to the public health use of these data. While the ability to identify at-risk individuals can
help public health agencies be more efficient with existing resources, these data are less useful
when public health practitioners lack the capacity to act. For example, public health surveillance
techniques can monitor trends of suicide ideation in near-real time, but if public health agencies
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resources to at-risk individuals for programs and benefits.44 Recent advances in
machine learning and artificial intelligence have the capacity to further amplify
these benefits but also raise concerns about unacceptable uses.45 For example,
commercial data brokers have increasingly detailed information about individuals
that they sell to businesses, individuals, and governments, using artificial
intelligence and machine learning tools to identify groups of people with certain
health conditions, such as diabetes, HIV, depression, and pregnancy, based on
their aggregated consumer data,46 and enabling businesses to target these
individuals with goods or services they might want or need. Certainly, these
practices are problematic when they enable exploitation of the vulnerable, but
these data can also facilitate interventions that promote social, economic, and
health equity.
In public health contexts, it is important to identify and address population
health threats, which can span varied domains, including hazardous products,
environmental contamination, occupational hazards, infectious disease, law, and
policies. The value of non-traditional public health data in advancing these aims
is becoming increasingly clear. It might be important to identify individuals with
an infectious disease who might pose a risk to others. In the case of sexually
transmitted infections, contact-tracing efforts can be essential to identify and
notify individuals of this risk.47 This contact-tracing can enable timely treatment
and inform people of the need for precautions.48 In the COVID-19 pandemic,
contact-tracing apps were developed to notify individuals if they were near
someone who tested positive for the virus.49 This information can prompt
individuals to get a test to confirm infection and notify them of the need for

lack the financial, human, or political capital to enact preventative interventions, the surveillance
data is not useful beyond informing the community of the public health issue. See generally
Marissa L. Zwald et al., Monitoring Suicide-Related Events Using National Syndromic Surveillance
Program Data, 11 ONLINE J. PUB. HEALTH INFORMATICS (2019); Deb Stone et al., Preventing
Suicide: A Technical Package of Policy, Programs, and Practices, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL (2017)
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicidetechnicalpackage.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMX8LFMK].
44 Monsen et al., supra note 39, at 119–21.
45 Alicia Solow-Niederman, Information Privacy and the Inference Economy, 117 NW. UNIV.
L.
REV.,
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
45),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3921003 [https://perma.cc/YK5P-W3F7].
46 DATA BROKERS: LAST WEEK TONIGHT WITH JOHN OLIVER, at 5:50 – 8:30,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqn3gR1WTcA [https://perma.cc/7MZT-LBFL].
47 Megan S. C. Lim et al., SMS STI: A Review of the Uses of Mobile Phone Text Messaging in
Sexual Health, 19 INT’L J. STD AIDS 287, 288 (May 2008).
48 Id.
49 Nadeem Ahmed et al., A Survey of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, 8 IEEE ACCESS
134577, 134578 (July 31, 2020); see generally Vittoria Colizza et al., Time to Evaluate COVID-19
Contact-Tracing Apps, 27 NATURE MED. 361 (Feb. 15, 2021).
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precautions around others.50 These contact-tracing apps had the potential to fill a
critical gap in the early pandemic as professional public health contact tracers—
chronically underfunded—were quickly overwhelmed by the highly contagious
disease.51 However, low adoption severely limited their utility.52 Specifically, the
apps often required users to opt in (e.g., downloading or turning the feature on).
Since the contract tracing apps required a critical mass of users to be effective,
the opt-in default settings—compounded by trust issues in the tech companies
developing the apps—were substantial barriers to the effective use of these
contract tracing apps in the U.S. response to COVID-19.53
Public health activities can have both positive and negative effects on
individual interests. For example, identifying an expectant mother to enroll in a
nurse-family partnership program will provide that person with services that will
directly improve their health and welfare. However, identifying an individual
with a dangerous infectious disease could lead to required isolation from
vulnerable individuals, interfering with the individual’s liberty interests.
Regardless, public health interventions should always be intended to promote
community health. Consequently, even public health actions that infringe on
some individual interests should confer at least some indirect personal or
community benefits.
Generally, public health agencies have been slow to adopt big data
approaches and tools. Limited funding and capacity, heavily siloed data sources,
complex data protection laws, and a decentralized public health system are
substantial barriers to U.S. public health agencies modernizing public health
informatics infrastructure.54 Consequently, public health agencies rely heavily on
traditional data sources, like disease reporting, surveys, public health registries,
50 Contact Tracer’s Interview Tool: Notifying People About an Exposure to COVID-19, CTRS.
DISEASE CONTROL (Updated Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/php/notification-of-exposure.html [https://perma.cc/52RA-H6PK] (Updated Sept. 22, 2021).
51 Linden et al., supra note 24, at 790.
52 Ahmed, supra note 49, at 134598; Eugene Y. Chan & Najam U. Saqib, Privacy Concerns
Can Explain Unwillingness to Download and Use Contact Tracing Apps when COVID-19
Concerns are High, COMPUT. HUM. BEHAV. (Jan. 28, 2021).
53 De la Garza, A., Why Aren’t COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Working? TIME (Nov. 10,
2020), https://time.com/5905772/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps/ [https://perma.cc/B2TB-2KVN]; J.
Rich, How Our Outdated Privacy Laws Doomed Contact-Tracing Apps, BROOKINGS (2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/01/28/how-our-outdated-privacy-laws-doomedcontact-tracing-apps/ [https://perma.cc/B2TB-2KVN].
54 See generally Panhuis et al., supra note 15; CDC Public Health Data Failures Mean U.S.
Lacks Whole Picture on COVID, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-1221/cdc-public-health-data-failures-mean-u-s-lacks-whole-picture-on-covid [https://perma.cc/5T4HQXYE] (last visited Apr. 11, 2022); Crumbling Data Infrastructure Undermines Nation’s
Pandemic Response, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. BLOG, https://www.chcf.org/blog/crumbling-datainfrastructure-undermines-nations-pandemic-response/ [https://perma.cc/N4YP-WQJ6] (last visited
Apr. 11, 2022).
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and syndromic surveillance. Nevertheless, there is intense study on the potential
of non-traditional data sources to promote population health.55 These efforts
include calls to promote investigation of new digital health applications—such as
using data from health information technology, wearable devices, mobile
applications, and other big data—to identifying challenges and opportunities to
incorporate new data sources to supplement public health responses.56 For
example, Katsis et al. applied big data methods to identify the top determinants
of life expectancy in San Diego, including data on the physical and built
environment and consumer buying patterns, and successfully identified important
factors (e.g., violent crime, parks, fast food density). However, their analysis had
to contend with differentially aggregated datasets that could not be combined, in
contrast to many private sector big data applications that utilize non-aggregated
data that are highly linkable.57 Widespread efforts to incorporate new data into
public health applications, including occupational and environmental health,
policymaking, and disaster response, are nascent and promising. However, their
success will hinge on the existence of data protection laws that permit data to be
used for these purposes.58
55 See generally Yannis Katsis et al., Big Data Techniques for Public Health: A Case Study,
2017 IEEE/ACM INT’L CONF. ON CONNECTED HEALTH: APPLICATIONS, SYS. AND ENG’G TECH.
(CHASE) 222, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8010636 [https://perma.cc/SV8B-2LQZ];
Sudip Bhattacharya et al., Applications of m-Health and e-Health in Public Health Sector: The
Challenges and Opportunities, 8 INT’L J. MED. & PUB. HEALTH 56–57 (2018); Jennifer L. Chan &
Hemant Purohit, Challenges to Transforming Unconventional Social Media Data into Actionable
Knowledge for Public Health Systems During Disasters, 14 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS 352–359 (2020), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/disaster-medicine-andpublic-health-preparedness/article/abs/challenges-to-transforming-unconventional-social-mediadata-into-actionable-knowledge-for-public-health-systems-duringdisasters/8E422A5362F4D81F9C7BFE51531DEF6A [https://perma.cc/J3QH-55US]; David M.
Stieb et al., Promise and Pitfalls in the Application of Big Data to Occupational and Environmental
PUB.
HEALTH
1–4
(2017),
Health,
17
BMC
https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-017-4286-8
[https://perma.cc/6VP7-62VP]; Michelina Mancuso et al., Proof of Concept Paper: NonTraditional Data Sources for Public Health Surveillance, PROC. OF THE 6TH INT’L CONF. ON DIGIT.
HEALTH CONF. 91 (2016) https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2896338.2896369 [https://perma.cc/J9AK4Y2B]; Zachary H. Seeskin et al., Uses of Alternative Data Sources for Public Health Statistics and
Policymaking: Challenges and Opportunities, 2018 JOINT STATISTICAL MEETINGS (2018)
https://www.norc.org/PDFs/Publications/
SeeskinZ_Uses%20of%20Alternative%20Data%20Sources_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R6245FDL].
56 Eric R. Buhi, Digital Health and AJPH: The Time Has Come!, 105 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 420
(2015).
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2015.302585
[https://perma.cc/US2E-XWLT]. See generally Chan & Purohit, supra note 55; Shawn Dolley, Big
Data’s Role in Precision Public Health, 6 FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH 68 (2018).
57 Katsis et al., supra note 55, at 226.
58 See Panhuis et al., supra note 15, at 1-9 (noting the legal barriers to public health data use);
Schmit et al., supra note 28, at 83–86.
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B. American Data Protection and Privacy Law
In the United States, statutes typically govern personal data, if they do so at
all, based on their substantive content. Many different federal laws do so, as do
some state laws. Until 2021, only one state—California—had a comprehensive
data privacy law. In that year, two more states—Virginia and Colorado—adopted
statutes similar in many ways to each other and quite different from California’s.
Also in 2021, the Uniform Law Commissioners adopted the Uniform Personal
Data Protection Act. This Section explains these developments.
1.

The Current Patchwork of Law

Sectoral laws that define protected data by their substantive content are
typical in the U.S. federal data protection framework. Most of them are sui
generis approaches to specific types of information or specific regulated entities.
Laws regulate health information,59 education records,60 substance use disorder
records,61 financial aid information,62 financial transaction records,63 video rental
history,64 children’s internet activity,65 government records,66 laboratory data,67
customer records,68 scientific research data,69 and social service data.70 Many of
these were enacted to address specific problems. For instance, the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)71 was enacted to address
fears that advancements in genomic science—specifically the discovery of
genetic markers predictive of future health conditions—would enable
discrimination by employers and insurers. Similarly, the Protection of Pupil

59 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), H.R. 3103, 104th
Cong. (1996); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102–164.534 (2021).
60 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R.
§§ 99.1–99.67 (2021).
61 Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.67 (2021).
62 Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C § 1092b; 34 C.F.R. Part 5b (2021).
63 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), S. Res. 900, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted); 16 C.F.R.
§ 313 (2021).
64 Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), S. Res. 2361, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted)
(amended by H.R. Res. 6671, 112th Cong. (2013) (enacted)); 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
65 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), S.R. 2326, 105th Cong. (2000)
(enacted); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
66 Privacy Act of 1974, S. Res. 3418, 93rd Cong. (1974) (enacted), 5 U.S.C. § 552.
67 Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, H.R. Res. 5471, 100th Cong.
(1988) (enacted); 42 C.F.R. § 493 (2021).
68 FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, as amended; Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), H.R. Res.
15073, 91st Cong. (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
69 Common Rule, supra note 9.
70 See the confidentiality provisions of 7 U.S.C. Ch. 51; 7 C.F.R. § 246.26.
71 H.R. Res. 493, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
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Rights Amendment (PPRA)72 was enacted to address parents’ concerns that
school-based surveys would collect information from children that parents
deemed inappropriate (e.g., politics, religion, sex, mental and behavioral health,
income).
State data privacy laws also usually limit their scope to data records with
certain kinds of information or regulated entities in certain industries.73 And
many states have long had comprehensive regulations regarding data records that
governments themselves collect.74 Here, too, many states have deliberated on
comprehensive bills, but until California in 2018 and now Virginia and Colorado
in 2021, none have been adopted.75
In public health, defining protected data records by the substantive content
of the information makes sense where the risks of inappropriate information use
or disclosure are sufficiently different than other data with different substantive
content. For example, during the early years of the AIDS epidemic, there was
enormous concern that AIDS and HIV records would be used to facilitate
discrimination and social stigma.76 In response, many states enacted special data
laws regulating HIV data differently than other health data.77 However, studies
cast doubt on whether these additional privacy protections were efficacious for
public health outcomes.78 Nevertheless, HIV and AIDS information carry
substantively different risks than other types of health information.
Consequently, such sensitive information may appropriately be subjected to
greater protections or restrictions than less sensitive information (e.g., phone
book information).
Critically, differential data protection on data types has consequences. For
example, health records can contain data that are regulated by different laws. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) governs health
72 20 U.S.C. § 1232(h).
73 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8601, 8602 (2021) (The Delaware Insurance Data
Security Act, covering security breaches of data records with financial and health information
retained by insurance licensees in the state).
74 See., e.g., MINN. STAT. § 13.02(7) (2020) (Minnesota Government Data Practices Act
governing “all data collected, created, received, maintained or disseminated by any government
entity”).
75 Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski, & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1772–76 (2021); see also VCDPA, supra note 4; CPA, supra note 4.
76 Matthew L. Levine, Contact Tracing for HIV Infection: A Plea for Privacy, 20 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 157, 183 (1988); James M. Tesoriero et al., The Effect of Name-Based Reporting
and Partner Notification on HIV Testing in New York State, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 728, 728
(2008).
77 Laura Lin & Bryan A. Liang, HIV and Health Law: Striking the Balance Between Legal
Mandates and Medical Ethics, 7 VIRTUAL MENTOR. 687, 687–89 (2005).
78 See Tesoriero et al., supra note 76, at 732–34 (finding evidence that the benefits of namebased reporting outweigh any potential deterrent effect).
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information collected or held by covered entities generally, but a health record
could contain information about HIV status, which may be subject to state laws,
or substance use disorder information, which is governed by the restrictive 42
CFR Part 2 regulations.79 In 2015, researchers railed against a decision by the
U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to strip research
datasets of all records containing substance use disorder codes to protect against
Part 2 violations.80 Researchers argued that the CMS application of Part 2 not
only left researchers and public health practitioners flying blind during the opioid
epidemic but also that the decision caused substantial harm by creating bias
within the remaining data and specifically tainting HIV and Hepatitis C
research.81 Additionally, distinct legal protections on different data types limit
opportunities to link datasets to discover important associations between various
factors.82 For instance, low education is one of the most significant causes of
death in the United States, killing approximately the same number of people
annually as heart attacks.83 However, the research exception in the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) does not permit use of
identifiable education records for health research, effectively hobbling data
scientists’ ability to understand this substantial cause of mortality.
Moreover, when datasets contain substantive information covered by
different data protection laws, multiple laws might apply simultaneously. For
example, up to six different data protection laws can apply to health records held
by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).84 Consequently, a legal
analysis of a proposed VA health data use or disclosure requires an analysis of
six different laws to determine which provisions of the laws are most stringent
and should apply.85 Public health data projects using data on different social,
79 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164. (n.d.); 42 C.F.R. Part 2. (n.d.); See Pennsylvania’s
Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7601, et al. (West).
80 See generally Austin B. Frakt & Nicholas Bagley, Protection or Harm? Suppressing
Substance-Use Data, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1879–1881 (2015).
81 Id. at 1881.
82 Braveman & Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 27; SCHMIT ET AL., supra note 30, at 2–3.
83 Galea et al., supra note 14, at 1462.
84 The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, implemented by 38 C.F.R. §§ 1.550–
1.562; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, implemented by VA at 38 CFR 1.575-1.582; the VA
Claims Confidentiality Statute; 38 U.S.C. § 5701, implemented by 38 CFR Section 1.500-1.527;
Confidentiality of Drug Abuse, Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) Infection, and Sickle Cell Anemia Health Records, 38 U.S.C. § 7332, implemented by 38
CFR 1.460–1.496; HIPAA, 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164; Confidentiality of Medical Quality
Assurance Review Records, 38 U.S.C. § 5705, implemented by 38 CFR 17.500–17.511.
85 DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., VHA DIRECTIVE 1605.01: PRIVACY AND RELEASE OF
INFORMATION 1, 3 (2016), https://www.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ID=3233
[https://perma.cc/73Z2-N9ZB] (providing that “all six statutes will be applied simultaneously” and
“the result will be the application of the more stringent provision for all uses or disclosures of VHA
health care data”).
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economic, and environmental factors frequently face similar issues because these
data are often covered by different laws within the U.S. patchwork.
2.

Changes on the Horizon

Most of the laws we have discussed here are federal laws. There have been
efforts to adopt a federal comprehensive data protection act, so far with no
success. At least eleven bills that would have provided a comprehensive federal
data protection regime were introduced in Congress between 2018 and 2020.86
Hearings continue on new initiatives.87 “The prospect for a comprehensive
federal privacy law coming to the fore in 2022 is slim,” however, thanks in part
to it being an election year in a closely divided Congress.88
States are beginning to move into the gap. In 2018, California adopted the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which became operative on January
1, 2020.89 Nevertheless, the voters considerably amended its provisions with a
referendum adopted in the 2020 general election, titled the “California Privacy
Rights Act of 2020,” with provisions taking effect January 1, 2023.90 While the
older provisions of the CCPA remain in effect through December 31, 2022, we
focus our attention in this Article on versions of the provisions that will be
effective in 2023.
Other states have not remained entirely idle during this time. There were
several failed attempts in various states to enact comprehensive privacy
legislation,91 but in 2021, two states succeeded where others failed: Virginia

86 Chander et al., supra note 75, at 1734 n.6 (2021); see also Solow-Niederman, supra note
45, at 38–39 (noting the “116th Congress, which convened from January 2019 to January 2021 and
featured a score of comprehensive (also sometimes called ‘omnibus’) information privacy statutes
alongside a bevy of bills that emphasize a particular aspect of information privacy”); Julie E.
Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-not-to-write-a-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/MPX6-22A8].
87 See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, Senate Hearing Opens the Door to Individual Lawsuits in
Privacy
Legislation,
BROOKINGS
TECHTANK
(Oct.
8,
2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/10/08/senate-hearing-opens-the-door-to-individuallawsuits-in-privacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/A334-Q6EE].
88 Jake Holland, 2022 Privacy Legislation Success Viable as Three States Lead Way,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 3, 2022, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-datasecurity/2022-privacy-legislation-success-viable-as-three-states-lead-way [https://perma.cc/TTG5NRQ2].
89 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 55 (A.B. 375) (West). The legislature amended it two times
within its first year of existence. 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 735 (S.B. 1121) (West); 2019 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 757 (A.B. 1355) (West).
90 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 24 (West).
91 See David Stauss, Status of Proposed CCPA-Like State Privacy Legislation as of June 14,
2021, BYTE BACK (June 13, 2021), https://www.bytebacklaw.com/2021/06/status-of-proposedccpa-like-state-privacy-legislation-as-of-june-14-2021/ [https://perma.cc/NGR8-Q4H8].
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adopted its Consumer Data Protection Act,92 with its terms slated to become
effective January 1, 2023,93 and Colorado followed suit when Governor Polis
signed the Colorado Privacy Act,94 with its terms taking effect July 1, 2023.95
Most recently, Utah and Connecticut became the fourth and fifth states to enact a
comprehensive privacy law, borrowing elements from the California, Virginia,
and Colorado statutes.96
Meanwhile, the Uniform Law Commissioners had decided to consider a
uniform statute, authorizing a drafting committee for the UPDPA in summer
2019 and adopting a final version of it in July 2021.97 ULC was formed to
promote consistency among state laws,98 and its uniform statutes have often been
met with great success. For example, the 2015 Revised Uniform Fiduciary
Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA) has been adopted in forty-five states
(along with the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands).99 It provides means
for fiduciaries like executors of estates, trustees, and attorneys-in-fact to gain
access to a principal’s intangible digital assets—including websites and domains
92 2021 Va. Legis. Serv. 1st Sp. Sess., Ch. 36 (S.B. 1392).
93 Id. § 4.
94 2021 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 21-190 (West).
95 Id. § 7.
96 Utah Consumer Privacy Act, SB 227 (2022); Connecticut Data Privacy Act, S.B. 6, (2022).
Unfortunately, we were unable to incorporate these most recent developments into our analysis due
to its proximity to publication.
97 Katie Robinson, New Drafting and Study Committees to be Appointed, UNIF. L. COMM’N
(July
24,
2019,
4:37
PM),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome/digestviewer/viewthread?MessageKey=bc3e157b-399e-4490-9c5c608ec5caabcc&CommunityKey=d4b8f588-4c2f-4db1-90e9-48b1184ca39a&tab=digestviewer;
UPDPA, supra note 4 (see title page) [https://perma.cc/EQ74-4HS6].
98 UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 3. State governments appoint ULC commissioners, all of
whom are members of the bar—some practicing lawyers and some legal scholars. ULC is not the
only national organization promoting uniform or model privacy legislation, though. In 2017, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, which represents state insurance regulators,
promulgated a state “Insurance Data Security Model Law.” INSURANCE DATA SECURITY MODEL
LAW (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS (2017), https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inlinefiles/MDL-668.pdf. [https://perma.cc/5BJ5-RL8L]. As of June 2020, NAIC claimed eleven states
had adopted the act. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RSCH., STATE
LEGISLATIVE BRIEF (2020),
https://www.naic.org/documents/cmte_legislative_liaison_brief_data_security_model_law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BHX-W9KQ]; See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 8601 (2021).
99 Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, Revised, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=f7237fc4-74c24728-81c6-b39a91ecdf22 [https://perma.cc/L5RN-JSL3]; see also Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/acts/ucc [https://perma.cc/256S-F3DV] (noting that all fifty U.S.
states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs common commercial
transactions, such as sales of goods, negotiable instruments, and secured transactions); UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2007) (governing organ donations and adopted in every
state—along with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands—except Delaware,
Florida, New York, and Pennsylvania).
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and computer files in the cloud—just as such fiduciaries have been able to access
tangible assets (like cars, real estate, etc.) to carry out the wishes of the
principal.100 Not all of ULC’s uniform statutes have been so widely adopted.101
Nor should the reader be misled by the “uniform” in each of these statutes’
names, because each jurisdiction may adopt the act with variations.102 As a
consequence of these limitations, it’s difficult to know whether, when, and how
provisions of the UPDPA will become the law in states.
Nevertheless, the interest that some populous states have shown in privacy
legislation and the speed with which the RUFADAA (and its revised version)
have been widely adopted suggest that the UPDPA may be on many legislatures’
agendas in spring 2022.103 Indeed, within six months of ULC’s adoption of the
UPDPA, three jurisdictions had introduced it for deliberation.104 In addition to
the UPDPA, the California, Virginia, and Colorado laws are serving as
alternative templates to states exploring comprehensive privacy legislation.105
The existing complexity in U.S. privacy law supports an argument for
comprehensive federal data privacy legislation that would preempt state acts:
Additional inconsistent privacy laws adopted state by state could further
complicate efforts to monitor public health issues across jurisdictions. We do not
100 FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT, REVISED (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2015).
101 For example, only eight jurisdictions (seven states and D.C.) have adopted 2007’s Limited
Cooperative Association Act. See Limited Cooperative Association Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=22f0235d-9d234fe0-ba9e-10f02ae0bfd0 [https://perma.cc/SXA7-FZ5C]. And so far, only four states (as of April
28, 2022) have enacted 2019’s Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act. Two more have
introduced legislation to adopt it. Registration of Canadian Money Judgments Act, UNIF. L.
COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=49ecb2a9a8b7-4041-8eba-e9d6f7293ea5 [https://perma.cc/5N42-J2BE].
102 I. Richard Ploss, Estate Planning for Digital Assets: Understanding the Revised Uniform
Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act and Its Implications for Planners and Clients, J. FIN.
PLANNING Apr. 2018 (noting that “state legislatures are free to pick and choose which sections [of a
uniform act] they wish to enact . . . .” so though “the RUFADAA defines a ‘fiduciary’ to include a
court-appointed conservator, New Jersey’s version of the RUFADAA specifically excludes a
conservator from the definition of a fiduciary”).
103 Stauss, supra note 91 (summarizing 2021 legislative initiatives from June 2021 and
identifying more than twenty states where bills had been introduced, of which only Virginia’s and
Colorado’s were adopted); see also CS/CS/HB 969 (2021) - Consumer Data Privacy, FLA. H. REP.,
https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=72062
[https://perma.cc/ZC3A-E3XP] (showing that this Florida bill failed to be adopted).
104
Personal
Data
Protection
Act,
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=28443329-e3434cbc-8c72-60b12fd18477 [https://perma.cc/H4B6-YVUQ].
105 As of April 7, 2022, fifteen U.S. states had at least one legislative proposal introduced in
both legislative houses, and Utah had adopted a statute. Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy
Legislation Tracker, IAAP.COM (Apr. 7, 2022), https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacylegislation-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/MS5Q-2RPY].
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have the space here to analyze all the potential preemption issues relating to the
UPDPA and the CAVACO statutes. We can note, however, as Professors
Chander, Kaminski, and McGeveran have done, that the new comprehensive
state laws are not likely preempted by any existing federal law under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.106 And a new comprehensive federal privacy law,
when enacted, might provide only a floor that state law could build on—much as
the previous sectoral federal laws have done—rather than a preemptive ceiling.107
Public health advocates on the whole view preemption with skepticism, however,
because such legislation has sometimes been proposed as a tool to suppress
innovative public health measures by local governments (e.g., taxes on sugarsweetened beverages, menu labeling).108 Nevertheless, within public health
informatics, variation in data protection laws stands as a barrier to public health
practice in and of itself.109 For similar reasons, data privacy advocates—and even
some members of the ULC—suggest that a comprehensive and preempting
federal privacy law is a preferred approach to the current U.S. patchwork.110
Legal scholars have not been silent regarding these developments, both from
the perspective of privacy law and of public health. Many of their commentaries
focus on normative concerns generally and particularly at the boundaries of these
two disciplines.
C. Normative Concerns at the Boundaries
Professors Daniel Solove and Paul Schwartz conceive of privacy as “a
constitutive element of civil society.”111 Professor Solove further identifies nearly
a dozen bases upon which privacy is therefore valuable.112 Deliberations on bills
covering data protection and data privacy occur against a backdrop of legal
106 Chander et al., supra note 75, at 1794–96.
107 Id. at 1797–99.
108 Policy Statement, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, Impact of Preemptive Laws on Public Health,
Policy Number: 201511 (Nov. 03 2015), https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/publichealth-policy-statements/policy-database/2016/01/11/11/08/impact-of-preemptive-laws-on-publichealth [https://perma.cc/59J8-65GL].
109 Schmit et al., supra note 28, at 84.
110 Joseph Duball, Uniform Law Commission Takes Up Privacy Law Endeavor, IAPP (Feb.
25,
2020),
https://iapp.org/news/a/uniform-law-commission-takes-up-privacy-law-endeavor
[https://perma.cc/CKN8-MMV3].
111 Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 28 (2020)
(quoting Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1613
(1999)).
112 Id. at 31–33 (identifying them as limiting government and company power, respecting
individuals, allowing reputation management, maintenance of appropriate social boundaries, trust,
“control over one’s life,” “freedom of thought and speech,” “freedom of social and political
activities,” the opportunity to “change and have second chances,” “protection of intimacy, body,
and sexuality,” and “not having to explain or justify oneself”).
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scholarship that theorizes the paradigm exhibited most in existing U.S. statutes as
the “notice and choice” or “consumer protection” paradigm.113 Its central tenet is
that those who gather and process data should be able to use it as they please, so
long as data subjects are able to decide whether to share data for primary and
secondary uses after being given notice of the intended uses. Much recent
scholarship has criticized this paradigm, including work that has noted
weaknesses in “notice and choice” on its own terms and work that has proposed
instead paradigms focused on other interests. We discuss them briefly here,
identifying normative concerns, especially as they relate to public health. We will
assess those concerns in relation to the UPDPA and CAVACO statutes in Part
III.
1.

Is “Notice and Choice” Possible?

Consumers’ attitudes reflect a preference for limiting the collection of their
personal information and a skepticism of sharing of their information with third
parties.114 Of course, consumer privacy attitudes vary considerably within
populations. For example, research has measured differences in privacy concerns
and behaviors between different age groups on social-network websites.115
Additionally, consumer experience can affect privacy concerns. For example,
individuals with more positive healthcare experiences were less concerned with
the privacy of their health records.116 Consumer privacy concerns are also
frequently a topic in national news coverage of data breaches, or novel data uses,
increasing public awareness and concerns.117
113 Solow-Niederman, supra note 45, at 17 (asserting that the California Act “remains
focused on individual rights and attempts to empower individuals by providing opportunities to
opt-out of data collection”); Cohen, supra note 86 (arguing that almost all current congressional
approaches “adopt a basic structure that is indebted to property thinking”).
114 CISCO CYBERSECURITY, CONSUMER PRIV. SERIES 3, 3–7, 11–12 (Nov. 2019)
https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/global/en_uk/products/collateral/security/cybersecurity-series-2019cps.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL99-M5S2]; H. Jeff Smith, Sandra J. Milberg & Sandra J. Burke,
Information Privacy: Measuring Individuals’ Concerns about Organizational Practices, 20 MIS Q.
167, 189, 195 (1996). See generally Timothy R. Graeff & Susan Harmon, Collecting and Using
Personal Data: Consumers’ Awareness and Concerns, 19 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 302 (2002); Mary J.
Culnan, “How Did They Get My Name?”: An Exploratory Investigation of Consumer Attitudes
Toward Secondary Information Use, 17 MIS Q. 341, 345 (1993).
115 See generally Murat Kezer, et al., Age Differences in Privacy Attitudes, Literacy and
Privacy Management on Facebook, 10 J. PSYCH. RSCH. CYBERSPACE CYBERPSYCHOLOGY (2016).
116 Vaishali Patel, et al., The Role of Health Care Experience and Consumer Information
Efficacy in Shaping Privacy and Security Perceptions of Medical Records: National Consumer
Survey Results, 3 JMIR MED. INFORMATICS 12–13 (2015).
117 Rob Copeland, Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on Millions
of Americans, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-s-secret-projectnightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans-11573496790
[https://perma.cc/VCW5-QDMK]; Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What
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While consumers often demand notice and choice rights, a growing body of
literature suggests that the sense of control they provide may be illusory. As
Alicia Solow-Niederman has noted, “individual rights to opt into or out of data
collection or subsequent uses won’t help if there are flaws in the individual
control model to begin with.”118
For example, there is a well-documented disconnect between consumers’
stated privacy attitudes and consumers’ privacy behaviors. The literature on this
“privacy paradox” describes a phenomenon where individuals who express
strong privacy concerns often will casually give personal information to
businesses or organizations that request it, receiving in return only a de minimis
benefit.119 Professor Daniel Solove has proposed to dissolve the privacy paradox
by noting that consumers’ abstract privacy preferences and their personal
practices in particular contexts are conceptually distinct.120 In his view, it is quite
consistent on the one hand for consumers to have privacy-enhancing preferences
in the abstract and on the other hand, for them to fail to protect their own privacy
when faced with a plethora of privacy policies and terms of use. The problem lies
in the structural implementation and context where notice and choice rights are
provided to consumers.
Unquestionably, the cost in time to assess each individual privacy option a
consumer has, what Solve calls “privacy self-management,” is great.121 Even
carefully designed interfaces intended to help consumers understand their choices
better122 are of little help if the consumer confronts hundreds of them during a

You Need to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/HLT5-W3KS].
118 Solow-Niederman, supra note 45, at 7.
119 Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox: Personal
Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFFS. 100, 118 (2007);
Patricia A. Norberg & Daniel R. Horne, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy-Related Behavior, 24
PSYCH. & MKTG. 829, 830 (2007); Susanne Barth & Menno D.T. de Jong, The Privacy Paradox:
Investigating Discrepancies Between Expressed Privacy Concerns and Actual Online Behavior, 34
TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 1038, 1039 (2017); Spyros Kokolakis, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy
Behaviour: A Review of Current Research on the Privacy Paradox Phenomenon, 64 COMPUTS. &
SEC. 122, 131 (2017).
120 Solove, supra note 111, at 4 (stating that “behavior involves risk decisions within specific
contexts,” while “[a]ttitudes are more general views about value and can exist beyond specific
contexts”).
121 Id. at 5 (“Managing one’s privacy is a vast, complex, and never-ending project that does
not scale; it becomes virtually impossible to do comprehensively.”).
122 See, e.g., Patrick Gage Kelley et al., Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of
the Nutrition Label Approach, CHI ‘10: PROC. SIGCHI CONF. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYS. 1573 (Apr. 2010) (describing development and testing of a graphical interface to facilitate
consumer privacy choices).
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year.123 Other legal scholars have also questioned whether consumers have the
capacity to understand the implications of their consent when increasingly
sophisticated algorithms are being developed to make predictions or inferences
about them or persons like them.124 These and other concerns raise legitimate
questions on whether notice and choice rights provide consumers meaningful
protections.
2.

Is “Notice and Choice” Desirable?

Many scholars have challenged the “notice and choice” paradigm on the
grounds that it starts with the wrong assumptions. These include scholars who
propose that there are interests at stake in data privacy and protection other than
those of the data subjects and those who collect and process the data; others
advocate for a model of “information fiduciaries.” There exists debate, too, as to
the extent that the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) should be a model for American regulation. Professor Julie Cohen has
noted that “[c]urrent approaches to crafting privacy legislation are heavily
influenced by the antiquated private law ideal of bottom-up governance via
assertion of individual rights, and that approach, in turn, systematically
undermines prospects for effective governance of networked processes that
operate at scale.”125 The individual rights approach may fail in terms of being
both over- and underprotective of individual interests.
The individual-rights paradigm is underprotective when it fails to account
for the ways that data may be used about consenting and non-consenting data
subjects. As Solow-Niederman has noted, “[i]t’s difficult to imagine that a social
media user who consented to a platform’s terms of service imagined that
disclosure in that context would permit . . . emergent profiling. When any bit of
data might be relevant in any range of future contexts, it becomes impossible for
an individual to conceptualize the risks of releasing data.”126 This is especially
true when data are processed by “downstream” recipients who have no direct

123 See generally Jacob Leon Kröger, Otto Hans-Martin Lutz & Stefan Ullrich, The Myth of
Individual Control: Mapping the Limitations of Privacy Self-Management (July 15, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3881776 [https://perma.cc/FS7G-9TKS].
See also Cohen, supra note 86, at 4 (“The continuing optimism about consent-based approaches to
privacy governance is mystifying, because the deficiencies of such approaches are well known and
relatively intractable.”); id. at 5 (“The issues that users must navigate to understand the significance
of consent are too complex and the conditions surrounding consent too easy to manipulate.”).
124 Solow-Niederman, supra note 45, at 24 (“Machine learning analytics make it practically
impossible for an individual to determine how data might or might not be significant or sensitive in
a future setting.”); Cohen, supra note 86, at 5, n.8–9.
125 Cohen, supra note 86, at 3.
126 Solow-Niederman, supra note 45, at 26.

177

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

21:1 (2022)

relationship with data subjects.127 The individual-rights paradigm also fails to
account for the ways that publicly available information about data subjects may
be combined using complex and opaque machine learning to profile persons who
have not consented to being profiled, a long-standing concern in the privacy
literature.128
The individual-rights paradigm is overprotective when it prevents data uses
that would produce significant public benefits. As Professors Jane Bambauer and
Brian Ray have noted, efforts to use technology to track the spread of COVID-19
were hampered by “state and federal governments (as well as influential private
firms) . . . prioritizing a fetishized notion of individual privacy over collective
public health.”129 The focus on individual privacy above all else led to poor
designs, destined to fail.130 They contrasted the efforts of the South Korean
government, which used “multiple independent sources of information—
geolocation, credit card data, closed-circuit television, facial recognition, and
old-fashioned interviews—to better trace contacts and predict the risk of
transmission for each person.”131 Bambauer and others have noted that “it doesn’t
make sense, given the particular characteristics of [COVID-19], to treat each
individual’s privacy choices as a matter for individual control. As with
lockdowns, the decision must be made at a collective level. A user choice
conception of privacy must give way to other societal interests.”132 Likewise,
Professor Alan Rozenshtein offered a full-throated defense of the principle that
mandatory “digital disease surveillance” is valuable but nevertheless refused to
endorse the idea, saying it is “conceivable . . . that digital disease surveillance is
never the right option; even well-designed digital disease surveillance presents
many dangers to privacy, liberty, and equality, and there is no guarantee that such
surveillance will be well designed.”133
Importantly, “notice and choice” is used to promote the ethical principle of
“respect for persons,” but it is not the only mechanism to do so. The foundational
127 Solow-Niederman, supra note 45, at 47.
128 See Brian N. Larson & Genelle I. Belmas, Second Class for the Second Time: How the
Commercial Speech Doctrine Stigmatizes Commercial Use of Aggregated Public Records, 58 S.C.
L. REV. 1, 23–29 (and sources cited therein).
129 Jane Bambauer & Brian Ray, COVID-19 Apps are Terrible—They Didn’t Have to Be 2
THE DIGITAL SOCIAL CONTRACT: A LAWFARE PAPER SERIES (Nov. 2020),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/covid-19-apps-are-terrible-they-didnt-have-be
[https://perma.cc/2EA4-8XDT].
130 Id.
131 Id. at 7.
132 Jane Bambauer et al., It’s Time to Get Real About COVID Apps, MEDIUM (May 14, 2020),
https://medium.com/@DataVersusCovid/its-time-to-get-real-about-covid-apps-dd82e08895f2
[https://perma.cc/H9UD-Z7CP].
133 Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Digital Disease Surveillance, 70 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1511, 1517
(2021).
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declarations of bioethics—including the Declaration of Helsinki and the Belmont
Report134—established the central tenets of bioethics and placed a special
importance on the principle of respect for persons. In clinical research contexts,
this often required taking steps to enable the autonomy of research subjects who
were seen as particularly vulnerable to abuse given the significant knowledge
gaps and power dynamics between researchers and their subjects. Informed
consent (i.e. “notice and choice”) became the primary tool to promote autonomy
and, by extension, respect for persons. In the context of established researchersubject relationships, where a duty of care exists (i.e., nonmaleficence), “notice
and choice” requirements can be powerful protections.
However, this bioethical approach to respect for persons is not well-suited
for all contexts. For example, in 1991 the Council for International Organizations
of Medical Sciences noted that traditional bioethical guidance did not adequately
cover the special features of epidemiological research, which concerns itself with
groups of people rather than individual research subjects.135 In the context of
public health surveillance, “notice and choice” protections can be problematic
because nonparticipation of a relative few can bias results and impede
community benefits.136 Consequently, public health ethicists recommend
different approaches to the “respect for persons” principle. Instead of relying on
“notice and consent,” public health ethicists recommend involving communities
in the decision-making process for population-level interventions.137 Like public
health, big data applications also must reckon with the unique ethical challenges
associated with population-scale activities as opposed to just the ethical
134 WORLD MED. ASS’N, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects (1964); NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUM. SUBJECTS OF BIOMED. &
BEHAV. RSCH., The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT].
135 Preamble, COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES,
INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL REVIEW OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES (1991).
136 One can argue that a right of “consent” has a countervailing “right to be counted.” For
example, the residents of Love Canal, N.Y., fought for a community-wide assessment of the health
effects of a nearby toxic waste dump. The empirical evidence showing a connection between the
waste and the community’s health empowered the community to force a governmental response.
GENESEO,
Jordan
Kleiman,
Love
Canal:
A
Brief
History,
SUNY
https://www.geneseo.edu/history/love_canal_history [https://perma.cc/LZ5M-9ZFN]. The “right to
be counted” asserts that what isn’t counted, doesn’t count, implying that assessing public health and
social problems is an essential step to correcting them. See Amy L. Fairchild, Ronald Bayer, &
James Colgrove, Searching Eyes : Privacy, the State, and Disease Surveillance in America, 14
INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
1826
(2008),
EMERGING
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2630762/ [https://perma.cc/LK6J-DLVA].
138 WORLD HEALTH ORG., Who Guidelines on Ethical Issues in Public Health Surveillance (2017),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/255721/1/9789241512657-eng.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/G7YE-H3ZF]. We choose “notice and choice” as our default term for this
paradigm, but when quoting the work of others, we use “notice and consent” if they do so.
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challenges typical of researcher-participant relationships.138
Another emerging alternative to the “notice and choice” paradigm uses the
concept of “information fiduciaries.” Professor Jack Balkin casts the information
fiduciary model as a “movement to viewing privacy in relational terms of trust
and trustworthiness.”139 For Balkin, fiduciary obligations are borne “out of social
relationships, and the power and vulnerability inherent in these relationships,”
whether those relationships are with a doctor, lawyer, or Facebook. Balkin argues
that the model is needed to respond to the vulnerability and dependence created
by information capitalism.140 Under this model, Balkin argues that digital
companies that collect and use end-user data should have three duties: care,
confidentiality, and loyalty. He argues that the duties of “confidentiality and care
require digital companies to keep their customers’ data confidential and secure”
and that these must “run with the data” (imposing a duty to “vet” partners and
downstream data processors).141 For Balkin, the duty of loyalty “means that
digital companies may not manipulate end users or betray their trust.”142
Interestingly, for Balkin, the duty of loyalty and to act in the interest of the
data subject extends beyond the individual to the public more broadly. He argues
that “large platforms like Facebook, Google, and Amazon have so many end
users that a requirement that they must act in the interests of their end users
effectively requires them to act in the interests of the public as a whole.”143 This
last point suggests the fiduciary model—which appears consumer-focused when
described as a relationship between a data subject and a data controller—could
function as a public-benefit model when applied to big data across many data
subjects or the whole population. From a public health perspective, a “best
interests” analysis could take into account community benefits from uses for
public health that result perhaps only in small marginal benefits to the individuals
to whom the data refer or only indirect benefits in the form of positive
externalities. Balkin’s fiduciary approach could be more consistent with a
bioethical (or even public ethics) approach to data protection given that fiduciary
obligations implicate other ethical principles beyond “respect for persons” and
because traditional “notice and consent” practices fall short of these

139

Lisa M. Lee, Public Health Ethics Theory: Review and Path to Convergence, 40 J. LAW MED. &
ETHICS 85–98 (2012).
140 Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11 (2020).
141 For example, he argues that to “live without interacting with any of these services means greatly
constricting one’s life and opportunities,” making the explicit point that “dependencies will
increase over time” and the implicit point that notice and choice models are quasi-illusory because
withholding consent has adverse consequences for an individual. Id. at 13.
141 Id. at 14.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
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considerations.144 The information fiduciary model is subject to continued
debate,145 and we do not have the space here to explore it fully.
Finally, there is debate about whether U.S. jurisdictions should shift away
from the consumer-focused data privacy model traditionally used in U.S. laws
and toward a more European data protection framework. Professors Chander,
Kaminski, and McGeveran argue that the traditional consumer-focused U.S.
approach to data privacy relies on the tenuous ability of “notice and choice” to
adequately protect consumers, assuming consumers get the benefit of their
bargain with data-collecting businesses. In contrast, they argue that a data
protection regime like the GDPR has protections that “follow the data” and
establishes the “default in Europe . . . that personal information cannot be
collected or processed unless there is a specific legal justification for doing
so.”146 Professors Chander, Kaminski, and McGeveran argue that the California
act “shares the presumption of most other American privacy law that personal
data may be collected, used, or disclosed unless a specific legal rule forbids these
activities.”147 Moreover, based on their analysis of an early draft of the UPDPA
and several state and federal privacy bills, they posit the idea that California is
driving comprehensive privacy regulation in American jurisdictions as opposed
to Europe.148 They conclude that California is poised to catalyze comprehensive
privacy regulation in American jurisdictions.149 We conclude below that the
144 The Belmont Report describes the “respect for persons” as having two primary
considerations: First, actions that promote an individual’s autonomy (i.e., informed consent);
second, protection of vulnerable persons. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 134. Balkin’s information
fiduciary model, in many respects, promotes the latter respect for persons principle in that it creates
a duty to act in the best interests of data subjects who might not fully understand the risks and
benefits associated with certain big data applications. See also Solow-Niederman, supra note 45.
145 See generally id.; Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information
Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019); Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of
U.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming)
Loyalty
for
Privacy
Law,
99
WASH.
https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3642217 [https://perma.cc/74PL-QE8F].
146 Chander et al., supra note 75, at 1747–48.
147 Id. at 1756.
148 Id. at 1771, 1772–76.
149 Id. at 1771, 1772–76. We note that Chander, Kaminski, and McGeveran discussed only
state legislative proposals that were not enacted and not the bills eventually enacted in Colorado
and Virginia. Chander et al., supra note 75, at 1772-76. This is no surprise as their article came out
about the time of these enactments. The timing also makes it likely that the version of the UPDPA
they analyzed was a draft from summer 2020, which looked radically different than the draft
eventually adopted in 2021. Compare Collection and Use of Personally Identifiable Data Act [draft
for
discussion
only]
(Apr.
24,
2020),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileK
ey=f897ee80-6e47-13cd-1370-2f8c395bdde6&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/65L4-R22J], with
UPDPA, supra note 4. One report of an empirical study of privacy policies since the GDPR and
CCPA sought evidence of the effect of these statutes on companies behavior. Jens Frankenreiter,
The Missing ‘California Effect’ in Data Privacy Law, 39 YALE J. REGUL., manuscript at 8-9
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UPDPA and CAVACO statutes chart a different route.150
Though, as we explain in the next subsection, we adopt the “notice and
choice” framework as our own normative paradigm, we do so with some
modifications reflecting this literature, and we will attempt to touch in Part III on
points where these other frameworks may be valuable.
3.

Defaults Should Play an Important Role

Given that “notice and choice” is the predominant paradigm in existing law
in the United States, both at federal and (as we shall see) state levels, the
normative framework we adopt here is grounded in that paradigm. A common
theme of many justifications for privacy is autonomy or agency of citizens; in
this case, data subjects.151 This aligns well with a foundational document on
research ethics well known among public health researchers and practitioners, the
Belmont Report.152 The Belmont Report values “respect for persons,” the
principle “that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents.”153 “An
autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals
and of acting under the direction of such deliberation.”154 Thus, “[t]o show lack
of respect for an autonomous agent is to repudiate that person’s considered
judgments, to deny an individual the freedom to act on those considered
judgments, or to withhold information necessary to make a considered
judgment . . . .”155
Our view is that for this autonomy to be possible, the data subject must
know how a controller will use their personal data—what we will call
transparency—and have a meaningful opportunity to deliberate on whether to
enter the relationship that involves the controller’s data practices. As we noted in
the previous subsection, such deliberation may be impossible or unlikely, and in
that event, regulators should set “defaults” in line with collective expectations
about data privacy. Within our framework, this means that most public health
data uses, whether primary or secondary, should be disclosed to data subjects but
either not subject to their consent or subject only to an opt-out, what we call

(forthcoming 2022) https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3883728 [https://perma.cc/M3ZU-6DK4]
(finding “the impact of EU data privacy law on the relationship between U.S. businesses and their
U.S. customers might be more limited than is commonly assumed”); id. at 9–10 (“cast[ing] doubt”
on the “expectation that the [sic] California’s new data privacy law (the CCPA) will have
nationwide effects”).
150 See infra Part III(A).
151 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 111, at 39–41.
152 BELMONT REPORT., supra note 134, pt. B(1).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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“passive consent.”156
Normatively, regulators should prefer that data practices that do not require
the consent of data subjects be disclosed wherever possible, even if they involve
data practices in which a data custodian or “controller”157 would be forced to
engage. For example, a privacy policy should inform data subjects that the
controller may disclose their personal data in response to a court order. Even if
all controllers acknowledge this data practice, leaving consumers with little
choice among them, it permits the (admittedly rare) consumer who is a privacy
hawk to choose to withhold their personal data from all such controllers.
Defaults play a different role, because they have an outsized impact on what
consumers will select.158 Requiring only passive consent (allowing for an optout)159 may be appropriate for data practices that data subjects would accept in
principle or that serve public policy goals; by default, the data subject consents to
them. Active consent (requiring an opt-in)160 may be appropriate for those
practices that data subjects typically reject or doubt in principle or that undermine
public policy goals; by default, the data subject does not consent. This does not
address all the concerns, as controllers may use a variety of other techniques to
pressure data subjects into actively consenting.161 Nevertheless, as we see below,
such a default approach has a critical role to play for public health matters.162
Absent regulatory defaults, data controllers will likely adopt the most selfserving approach, often at the expense of or risk to data subjects.
Of course, accepting that defaults are a good idea and knowing what they
should be are two very different things. Despite some notable differences in
privacy attitudes within the broader population, there is a growing body of
literature showing broad support for the use of data for research purposes.163 The
public is generally comfortable sharing their personal information if they believe
156 See infra Part II(E)(2).
157 See infra Part II (defining terms).
158 See infra Part II(E)(2).
159 Infra Part II(E)(2).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See infra Part I(C)(3).
163 See, e.g., Mhairi Aitken et al., Public Responses to the Sharing and Linkage of Health
Data for Research Purposes: A Systematic Review and Thematic Synthesis of Qualitative Studies,
17 BMC MED. ETHICS 1 2, 4–5 (Nov. 10, 2016); Laura J. Damschroder, et al., Patients, Privacy and
Trust: Patients’ Willingness to Allow Researchers to Access Their Medical Records, 64 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 223, 224 (2007); S.B. Haga & J. O’Daniel, Public Perspectives Regarding Data-Sharing
Practices in Genomics Research, PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 319, 321–22 (Apr. 27, 2010); Emily C.
O’Brien, et al., Patient Perspectives on the Linkage of Health Data for Research: Insights from an
Online Patient Community Questionnaire, 136 INT’L J. MED. INFORMATICS 9, 12–15 (2019); Donald
J. Willison, et al., Patients’ Consent Preferences for Research Uses of Information in Electronic
Medical Records: Interview and Survey Data, 326 B. MED. J. 1, 3 (Feb. 15 2003).
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that their information will contribute to the furtherance of scientific knowledge.
This is particularly true for health research where participants may believe that
sharing their personal health information may confer some indirect benefit in the
form of new discoveries or improved treatments for their health conditions.164
Further evidence of the public’s attitudes is provided by a series of studies
that two of the authors (Schmit and Kum) have been performing with others.165 In
February 2020, they conducted a survey of 504 adults in the United States who
were fluent in English and recruited by a consumer research company hired to
identify a representative national sample.166 The respondents were balanced for
gender, race/ethnicity, age, education, income, and census region. Their health
insurance coverage was also similar to the national distribution in data published
by the U.S. Census Bureau. Researchers sought consumers’ relative preferences
among scenarios that varied based on the source of identifiable data, who would
be using it, and the proposed data use (taking into account both legal restrictions
and exceptions for data use or disclosure). The fractional factorial design the
researchers used in the study allowed them to test seventy-two different data-use
scenarios to determine consumers’ relative preferences among them and to assess
the weight that each variable had in the consumers’ decisions. Through this
design, the researchers were able to test whether consumer preferences aligned
with the patchwork approach to U.S. privacy laws by using scenarios that varied
according to the purpose for which their data would be used, the persons or
entities using the data, and the type of data used. Use of these methods by the
researchers allowed them to assess comparative weighting for various features in
a manner not typically pursued in the research literature.
For these consumers’ preferences, information about the purpose for which
the data would be used was the highest priority, the identity of the user of
second-greatest importance, and the nature of the data used of least importance.
First, consumers supported uses for promoting population health and for research
leading to scientific knowledge; they disfavored uses for identifying criminal
activity, marketing and recruitment, and, most significantly, undifferentiated
profit-driven activities. Second, consumers preferred data uses by university
researchers, followed by non-profit organizations; they disfavored government
and business users. Finally, consumers were most tolerant of uses of educational
and health records and less tolerant of data from government sources and data
relating to consumers’ economic activity or customer behavior. The four sources
164 Aitken et al., supra note 163, at 12.
165 See generally Cason D. Schmit et al., US Privacy Laws Go Against Public Preferences:
Impeding Public Health and Research: Survey Study, 23 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 1 (July 5, 2021).
Another study, looking at changes to responses nine months into the COVID-19 pandemic, is in
preparation.
166 Id.
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of data, however, were fairly close to being neutral in consumers’ assessments.
When Schmit, Kum, and their colleagues combined the factors in the
scenarios, they found that the top ten most acceptable scenarios all involved use
by a university researcher or non-profit for scientific research or public health.
Represented among the top ten were all four data sources: education, health,
government-program related, and economic or customer activity. The five most
disfavored scenarios involved for-profit businesses using data for profit-driven or
marketing activities—regardless of the nature of the consumer data used.
Rounding out the bottom ten least-favored uses were those involving for-profit or
government uses to market programs or products and to identify criminal
activity.
The researchers noted the inconsistency between consumer preferences and
existing privacy laws: “Ironically, our data indicate that the U.S. public’s most
preferred data re-use scenario is currently prohibited under FERPA while the
U.S. public’s least preferred data re-use is completely legal and ubiquitous under
the permissive FTC Act.”167
The true picture of the public’s preferences is of course far more complex.
Public support for some data uses and for privacy frequently does not square with
the fact that data privacy and data utility are competing interests. Data controllers
can substantially increase data privacy, but these efforts will often make the data
more difficult (or impossible) to use for certain purposes. Alternatively, fewer
privacy restrictions make data more useful, but they increase the privacy risks for
data subjects. For example, data can be deidentified to protect the identity of data
subjects, but without identifiers, these data can no longer be linked to other
databases to answer otherwise unsolvable problems. Similarly, individual privacy
preferences can be incongruent. For example, some patients want their
information used for research to be deidentified, and they also want to be asked
before their information is reused for new research projects.168 These wishes are
incompatible: Researchers have no way to notify a deidentified data subject,
much less ask for their consent to subsequent data uses. Consequently, policy and
good data governance practices, grounded in data subjects’ preferences and
interests, are critical tools to balance the competing interests of privacy and data
utility.
Trust, transparency, and individual control are critical factors for sharing
data for research purposes.169 The absence of any one of these can swiftly
undermine public support in research data uses. For example, Google and the
Ascension health system partnered to develop and test new big-data tools for
167 Id.
168 Aitken et al., supra note 163, at 12.
169 Id. at 12–14.
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healthcare applications.170 This partnership was not publicly transparent, and
patients were not notified or asked to opt in to the research partnership.171 The
absence of a consent undermined Ascension’s patients’ sense of control. The lack
of transparency of the partnership with the commercial entity Google raised
suspicions and undermined trust in the endeavor. As a result, the partnership
faced substantial backlash.
In summary, privacy is popular with consumers in principle, but their
conduct seems often to run counter to their expressed preferences. A resolution
of this privacy paradox requires transparency from controllers and action from
regulators to set the defaults of consumer consent, defaults that reduce social
harms and promote social benefits. Informing those defaults should be our
developing knowledge of consumers’ preferences and an awareness of the
tension between data privacy and data utility, recognizing that public health
practices receive considerably more support from consumers than profit-driven
activities.
Effective public health responses sometimes require balancing the rights of
individuals and their autonomy with the needs of the community. It may be
necessary for the community’s well-being to use personal data without data
subjects’ opportunity to deliberate and to choose to participate.172 Decisions to do
so should not be taken lightly, however.173
In Part II, we will examine the three state comprehensive statutes adopted so
far and the new uniform data privacy act to assess their substantive provisions,
particularly those related to public health. In Part III, we will assess them against
these normative frameworks and propose next steps for public health researchers
and professionals.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE UPDPA AND CAVACO STATUTES
The descriptive task of this Article is somewhat daunting, and it may seem
that we are getting quite far down “into the weeds,” but for the reader interested
in making a comparative assessment of the UPDPA and California, Virginia, and
Colorado acts—what we have called the “CAVACO statutes”—a thorough
doctrinal description is necessary before a normative evaluation. Those readers
who are legislators or planning to take part in legislative deliberation, lobbying,
etc., over similar acts will likely benefit from the detailed analysis in this Part.
170 Copeland, supra note 117.
171 Nevertheless, this project was likely compliant with HIPAA’s requirements. The Google
and Ascension had a signed business associate agreement, and the development of software tools
likely falls within the HIPAA allowance for use and disclosure for healthcare operations or under
HIPAA’s generous research exception. 45 CFR § 164.501, 502. 512(i); Copeland, supra note 117.
172 Bambauer et al., supra note 132; Rozenshtein, supra note 133, at 1517.
173 Rozenshtein, supra note 133, at 1517.
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Other readers may prefer to skip to Part III, our normative assessment of these
statutes, referring back to this Part only for details of interest.
Here, we lay out a conceptual framework, which allows us to define terms to
use as representational devices in a discussion of the subject matter. We intend it
as a vocabulary where the definitions are stipulated but expected to be consistent
with a layperson’s intuitions about what they mean and how they are used. This
framework could prove useful for other efforts to compare privacy paradigms
and statutes.174 The CAVACO statutes and the UPDPA have some common
requirements and some that differ. This Part examines the UPDPA in more detail,
setting out its basic requirements; scope; favored, restricted, and prohibited data
practices; and enforcement and penalties, noting its differences from the
CAVACO statutes and their differences from each other. Along the way, we will
point out interesting features and address terms that will be of interest to public
health professionals and researchers.
For our conceptual framework, we have drawn from the European Union’s
GDPR,175 the American Law Institute’s 2019 statement of the principles of data
privacy law,176 and the legislative enactments we analyze below when we have
found them conceptually sound.
As a preliminary matter, a distinction between “information” and “data” is
tenable on grounds that the data that are recorded may or may not accurately
represent the information about the individual or the world. We can think of
“information” as the truth about the world and “data” as what’s collected.177
We’ll refer to a “data record” to denote data that are stored in some readable
form.178 “Personal data” is any data “relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person . . . .”179 “[A]n identifiable natural person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly.”180 A “personal data record” is thus a data record
containing personal data. The individual about whom a personal data record
purports to record information is a “data subject.”181 We will refer to a “datarecord practice,” or just “data practice” for short, as “collection, recording,
174 See, e.g., Chander et al., supra note 75, at 1749–62 (comparing CCPA, GDPR, and
proposed state legislation).
175 See generally 2016 O.J. (L 119).
176 See generally PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1.
177 Cf. PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1, § 2(a) (2019). Of course, one can make a
statement about data, i.e., offer information about data. But here we are generally concerned with
information about and data relating to human beings.
178 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (“[T]he term ‘record’ means any
item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency.”).
179 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(1). See also PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1, § 2(b)
(2019).
180 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(1).
181 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(1). This is also the language the UPDPA uses. UPDPA, supra
note 4, § 4. See also PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1, § 2(C) (2019).
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organi[z]ation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction” of
personal data records.182
Some individual or entity must engage in a data practice for there to be a
legal question. We define a “data controller” as a natural person or entity that
“determines the purposes and means” of a data practice,183 and a “processor” as
the natural person or entity that actually performs a data practice.184 If the same
entity both decides what data practices to undertake and also performs them, it is
both a controller and a processor regarding that data practice.185 Because of their
power to decide, “data controllers have greater responsibilities than data
processors.”186 Not all controllers are created equal, however. Acting together or
with others, one controller “collects personal data directly from a data
subject”187—it is the “collecting controller.” As a controller, the collecting
controller “determines the purpose and means of processing” of the data
records,188 but it may also make the data records available to another controller, a
“third-party controller.”189
Many uses of personal data are “secondary uses” or “secondary data
practices,” where data collected for one purpose is re-used for a different
purpose. These secondary uses often require dissemination by the collecting
controller to some other controller. For example, consumers might consent to
having their local dry cleaner share records about their dry-cleaning purchases
with a university researcher, who might then process the records for purposes of
182 2016 O.J. (L 119), Art. 4(2). This is the definition that the GDPR provides for
“processing,” and is quite similar to the activities that the Privacy Act of 1974 defines as
“maintaining” a record. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(3) (“[T]he term ‘maintain’ includes maintain, collect,
use, or disseminate.”). The UPDPA defines “maintain” more narrowly. UPDPA, supra note 4,
§ 2(8) (“‘Maintains,’ with respect to personal data, means to retain, hold, store, or preserve personal
data as a system of records used to retrieve records about individual data subjects for the purpose of
individualized communication or decisional treatment.”). See also PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY,
supra note 1, § 2(d) (listing “collection,” “access,” “retention,” “use,” “sharing,” and “destruction”
as “personal data activities”).
183 Compare 2016 O.J. (L 119), Art. 4(7) with PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1,
§ 2(e).
184 Compare 2016 O.J. (L 119), Art. 4(8) with PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1,
§ 2(f). But see Solow-Niederman, supra note 45, at 48 (taking “controller” to mean collecting
controller and “processor” to include third-party controllers).
185 The UPDPA takes a different tack, seeming to make “controller” and “processor”
mutually exclusive. UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(12) (defining “processor” as one “that processes
personal data on behalf of a controller” (emphasis added)).
186 PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. g.
187 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(1).
188 Id. § 2(3).
189 Id. § 2(21).

188

DATA PRIVACY IN THE TIME OF PLAGUE

research. In this example, the dry cleaner is a collecting controller, the university
researcher is a third-party controller, and their research practices are secondary
data practices.
Along this pipeline, any controller may use one or more processors.
Controllers need not use external processors, in which case they would engage in
the processing in-house. Thus, a collecting controller may be the only stop in a
pipeline that it builds and maintains. The dry cleaner in the example above, for
example, might use its own customer data records to market related services to its
customers. It is then the sole collecting controller of the data records, and there
are no other processors. Much more elaborate pipelines are, however, possible.
Given this basic vocabulary, we can consider several components that a
conceptual framework for data protection must have. A critical one—and thus the
first we address—is the definition of which data records are subject to the
regulation. Second, we take up some considerations relating to controllers and
processors. Third, we discuss common data practices that are subject to
regulation. Fourth, we consider matters of the scope and jurisdiction of data
privacy law. Finally, we will briefly mention enforcement mechanisms and
penalties for violating the data privacy laws.190
A. Substantive Information Content
The UPDPA and CAVACO statutes are comprehensive personal data
protection laws. Like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation,
the CAVACO statutes and the UPDPA include within their scope all personal
data; importantly, though, they carve out a variety of exceptions and exemptions.
Other U.S. federal and state data protection laws define protected data records
using some form of description of the substantive content of the information they
purport to represent or the nature of the controllers or processors.191 We discuss
the normative consequences of those choices in Part III.192
Subject to the UPDPA are “personal data” that relate to a “data subject” that
a “collecting controller” collects and of which the controller maintains a
“record.”193 Personal data under the UPDPA is “a record that identifies or
describes a data subject by a direct identifier or is pseudonymized data,” tracking
the CAVACO statutes fairly closely.194 UPDPA and the CAVACO statutes
190 Because our principal focus is on public health activities, we assume that the actors
involved will avoid violating the laws’ requirements and may therefore be less concerned about
enforcement. Readers attempting to assess risks for private actors under UPDPA and the CAVACO
statutes should review those provisions of the acts and advise clients accordingly.
191 Supra Section I(B).
192 Infra Section III(B).
193 UPDPA, supra note 4, §§ 2(1), 2(4), 2(10).
194 Id. § 2(10); CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(o)(1) (“‘Personal information’ means information
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exclude some data from “personal data” based on their identifiability or
sensitivity, discussed further below. There are also some substantive categories
of data excluded: For example, these acts do not cover personal data “processed
or maintained in the course of a data subject’s employment or application for
employment.”195
The UPDPA and CAVACO statutes take slightly different approaches to an
exemption for personal data “processed or disclosed as required or permitted by a
warrant, subpoena, or court order or rule, or otherwise as specifically required by
law.”196 The UPDPA exempts these practices from its own application, but we
argue it would protect data subjects better if it covered these data while
permitting their disclosure only to the extent required by law, categorizing such
disclosures as favored or “compatible” data practices, leaving them subject to the
act.197 The CAVACO statutes take the latter approach, not exempting these types
of data from coverage but expressly not limiting a controller or processor’s
ability to respond to the situations described in this paragraph.198
that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could
reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”); VCDPA,
supra note 4, § 59.1-575 (“any information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or
identifiable natural person”); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1303(17)(a) (identical to VCDPA).
195 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(c)(5). Though the official comment does not explain this
exclusion, it would be reasonable to conclude that it has been excepted here because of the
significantly different nature of the employment relationship and because state laws presently offer
varied protections for data relating to employees. See also CCPA, supra note 4, § 145(m)(1)
(excluding a variety of employment-related activities); VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-575
(excluding from definition of “consumer,” VCDPA’s counterpart to data subject, “a natural person
acting in a commercial or employment context”); id § 59.1-575(c)(14) (excluding employmentrelated data from application under the act); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1304(k) (excluding “data
maintained for employment records purposes”). Such a limitation in UPDPA is not without its
likely critics. Elizabeth A. Brown, The Fitbit Fault Line: Two Proposals to Protect Health and
Fitness Data at Work, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL. L. & ETHICS 1, 14 (2016) (detailing employer uses
of surveillance data); id. at 24 (asserting that HIPAA does not cover them); id. at 46–47 (proposing
that HIPAA’s definition of covered entities include employers, fitness-app developers, and
wearable-device manufacturers).
196 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(c)(3). This is peculiar, and possibly a drafting error, in part
because personal data relating to a data subject, even sensitive data, would be taken out of
protection of UPDPA in the event the controller or processor had to disclose it in litigation with a
third party. Thanks to this exemption, it appears the third party would be under no restriction where
further processing and disclosure of the data are involved. The controller or processor might
reasonably seek a protective order when disclosing the data. Perhaps the act should require this.
197 In fact, UPDPA elsewhere implies that type of disclosure is a compatible data practice.
See UPDPA, supra note 4, § 7(b)(2), (7), (9) (defining compatible data practices to include
processing “reasonably necessary to comply with a legal obligation or regulatory oversight of the
controller,” processing in a manner that “is reasonably necessary to prevent, detect, investigate,
report on, prosecute, or remediate an actual or potential” crime, and processing that “is reasonably
necessary to comply with or defend a legal claim”).
198 CCPA, supra note 4, § 145(a); VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-582(A); CPA, supra note 4,
§ 6-1-1304(3)(a).
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A second exemption from the UPDPA of interest here relates to research: the
UPDPA does not apply to personal data “processed or maintained solely as part
of human-subjects research conducted in compliance with legal requirements for
the protection of human subjects.”199 This appears broadly to support the use of
personal data for research purposes subject to the Common Rule and potentially
other regimes for research ethics. Personal data collected, analyzed, and used in
accord with such a research protocol would thus entirely escape the application
of the UPDPA. The “solely” in the UPDPA is important, however. Data
“processing” under the UPDPA includes collecting data.200 This exemption,
applying only to personal data collected solely for research, probably does not
cover disclosures by controllers and processors to secondary data researchers.
For example, if Amazon were to provide personal data about its customers’
transactions (identifying customers) to a researcher solely so that the researcher
could do IRB-approved research, this does not appear to be processing “solely as
part of human-subject research” because the data was initially collected for a
non-research purpose (i.e., commercial transaction). This data would be useful to
public health researchers because consumer behavior data can be used to infer
and predict health status. Similarly, these data would enable researchers to
determine whether there is a connection between using certain products and
certain health outcomes.
Getting such data from companies like Amazon is a boon for researchers
because it removes the cost of recruiting survey participants from the public and
provides a complete picture of the population (at least of Amazon users). But the
researchers do their processing, limited by the IRB protocol, solely as part of
human-subjects research, while Amazon, the collecting controller of the personal
data, collects and processes the data for other reasons. As the UPDPA covers
these data, researchers would instead have to determine whether the data practice
is permitted under it.201
Slightly less strict is the Virginia Act, which broadly exempts data records in
research conducted according to applicable ethical standards.202 But it goes
further and exempts information used “only for public health activities and
purposes as authorized by HIPAA,”203 which includes disclosures to a “public
health authority that is authorized by law to collect or receive such information
for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability,
including, but not limited to, the reporting of disease, injury, vital events such as
birth or death, and the conduct of public health surveillance, public health
199 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(c)(2) (emphasis added).
200 Id. § 2(11).
201 See infra Part II(E).
202 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-576(C)(4).
203 Id. § 59.1-576(C)(9).
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investigations, and public health interventions.”204 This exemption, however,
affects disclosures only by “covered entities,” which are a “health plan,” “health
care clearinghouse,” or “health care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by” the
act.205 And the “only” in the operative Virginia provision again prevents the
secondary uses contemplated in the Amazon example.
More relaxed still are the California and Colorado Acts. The California
statute starts with a somewhat similar approach to the UPDPA, exempting from
its application personal data that are either (a) deidentified as provided in the
Code of Federal Regulations and “derived from patient information that was
originally collected, created, transmitted, or maintained by an entity regulated by
[HIPAA], the Confidentiality Of Medical Information Act, or . . . the Common
Rule;”206 or (b) ”collected, used, or disclosed in research, as defined in [45 C.F.R.
§ 164.501] . . . and that is conducted in accordance . . . the Common Rule” or
similar regulations.”207 But the California statute exempts use and disclosure in
research. Colorado’s statute also exempts data records collected in IRB-approved
research, but like California’s, it goes further in exempting “personal data used or
shared in research.208 Either statute would allow our hypothetical researcher to
get access to the hypothetical Amazon data discussed in the previous paragraph,
arguing it is not covered by the applicable statute.
B. Data Identifiability
U.S. data protection laws predominantly protect only identified or
identifiable data records.209 Consequently, how identifiability is defined in a law
is essential to determine whether the law protects a data record. Such definitions
often include one or more of three factors: The presence of direct identifiers, the
presence of indirect identifiers, and the likelihood of identification through
inference. In some cases, identifiability definitions are difficult to apply, so some
laws include legal standards for taking identified data and rendering it
pseudonymous or deidentified by law. A law may then provide different levels of
protection for these levels of identifiability, or it may exclude one or more of
204 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.
205 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
206 CCPA, supra note 4, § 146(a)(4)(A).
207 Id. § 146(a)(5).
208 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1304(2)(d) (emphasis added).
209 There are some notable exceptions of laws that protect information based on its content.
For example, trade secret laws protect information that can be identifiable (e.g., customer lists) or
non-identifiable (e.g., marketing strategies). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 134A.002(6) (West, 2021). Similarly, the Freedom of Information Act excludes certain sensitive
government records from its disclosure requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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them from its application. This Section describes these different degrees of
identifiability—direct identifiers, indirect identifiers, and inferences—and
explains deidentification and pseudonymized data.
Direct identifiers are data that can in theory be used by themselves to
identify a specific individual. Common examples of direct identifiers include
names, social security numbers, home addresses, email addresses, and phone
numbers. Most direct identifiers are insufficient by themselves, however, to
identify a specific individual with certainty. For example, the name “John Smith”
is common and does not differentiate one John Smith from another, and even
social security numbers are not always unique to an individual.210 Still, these data
can practically identify many individuals. Consequently, direct identifiers are
often a core part of legal definitions of identifiability.211
Indirect identifiers can identify an individual, but only in combination with
other data. For example, a million or more Americans may share a birthday,
excluding the year—an indirect identifier—so date of birth cannot, by itself,
identify an individual. However, knowing the date of birth of John Smith might
enable someone to distinguish one “John Smith” from another. Similarly, postal
(ZIP) codes, race, and gender information are indirect identifiers that, together
with other data, can help identify a data subject.212
Laws that define identifiable personal data as including indirect identifiers
can impede socially beneficial secondary data practices. For example, health,
economic, and social outcomes can vary considerably depending on an
individual’s race or where they live, and data about them are often essential to
research on public health. If a data processor strips data of all indirect identifiers
to free it from a law’s restrictions, the secondary use of the data records for
research can be severely limited.
Some laws define identifiability by the possibility that an individual might
determine the identity of a particular data subject by inference rather than by the
presence of specific direct or indirect identifiers, for example, where “there is a
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the
individual,”213 or where there is information “alone or in combination” that
“would allow a reasonable person in the . . . community, who does not have
210 Frank Hayes, Not So Unique, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 6, 2007, 12:00 AM),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/2552992/not-so-unique.html
[https://perma.cc/2T6S26CC].
211 GDPR, for example, gives the following examples of direct identifiers: “a name, an
identification number, location data, [or] an online identifier . . . of [a] natural person.” 2016 O.J.
(L 119), art. 4(1).
212 GDPR gives the following examples of indirect identifiers: “one or more factors specific
to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural
person.” 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(1).
213 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
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personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to identify the [data subject]
with reasonable certainty.”214 All of these approaches to defining legally
identifiable data ask data processors to consider the possibility that someone else
could identify a data subject of a data record.215
Therein lies a critical problem: when data pertain to individual data subjects,
often it is mathematically possible to identify at least some data subjects within a
dataset.216 Quantitatively minded data processors are of course keenly aware that
without substantial redaction or data manipulation, there will always be a
lingering possibility that a data subject may be reidentified if a disclosed dataset
is combined with external information.217 Consequently, absent clear safe-harbor
provisions, laws that define identifiability using the possibility, foreseeability, or
reasonable belief that a data subject may be reidentified using inference will
always create uncertainties due to persistent possibilities of reidentification.
Perhaps because of ambiguities in legal definitions of identifiability, some
laws include standards for deidentifying data. Deidentified data are data once
protected by a data protection law that have been modified or redacted in such a
way that they have much-diminished or even no protection under the law.
Deidentification standards are particularly important for laws with broad or
ambiguous definitions for identifiable data because persistent uncertainties about
a law’s applicability may prevent a data processor from disclosing data for
socially desirable purposes. For example, HIPAA defines protected data as that
which “identifies an individual” or where there is a reasonable belief that it can
identify an individual. Absent a specific deidentification standard, it is difficult to
know what data elements need to be redacted or modified so the data no longer
meets this definition. Fortunately, HIPAA regulations contain standards that
permit data processors to render data legally deidentified.218
Some data protection laws define a middle ground between identifiable data
and deidentified data. Data in this middle ground are sometimes called
214 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2021).
215 Contrast the Common Rule, which draws the boundary here: “identity of the subject is or
may readily be ascertained by the investigator.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.102. This is narrower and more
easily determined than the other tests. See also PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1, § 2(b)
(including in definitions whether “there is a moderate probability” or “low probability” that data
“could be linked to a specific natural person”).
216 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1713 (2010). But see, Victor Janmey & Peter L. Elkin, ReIdentification Risk in HIPAA De-Identified Datasets: The MVA Attack, AMIA ANN. SYMP. PROC.
1329, 1329 (2018); Kathleen Benitez & Bradley Malin, Evaluating Re-identification Risks with
Respect to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 17 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 169, 169 (2010).
217 Hye-Chung Kum et al., Social Genome: Putting Big Data to Work for Population
Informatics, 47 COMPUT. 56, 61–63 (2014); Benitez & Malin, supra note 216; see also Ohm, supra
note 216.
218 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b).
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“pseudonymized,” “coded,” or “limited” data. We will use the first of these
terms. For example, GDPR defines pseudonymous data as personal data that “can
no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional
information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is
subject to technical and organi[z]ational measures to ensure that the personal data
are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.”219 Other laws
define it as data that is partially deidentified (or less identifiable) but does not
have a key or code that connects a pseudonym with data subject identifiers.220
Pseudonymized data is an important category for public health research and
public health population interventions. Often, research proceeds with protocols in
place to replace direct identifiers in the data, such as participants’ names and
email addresses, with codes that allow data about a single participant to be
examined in the aggregate without identifying the participant. Often researchers
will keep a “key” that would allow reidentification.
By incorporating reduced restrictions for less identifiable data, laws
implicitly recognize the tradeoff between privacy and data utility. Provisions that
give additional flexibility for less-identifiable data enable greater data use than
would typically be permitted under an all-or-nothing approach where data are
either identifiable and fully protected or not identifiable and not protected. Data
in these categories often receive a lower level of protection under the data
protection laws. Laws that have special provisions for pseudonymized data often
require some information redaction or modification (usually the removal of
enumerated direct or indirect identifiers), but not so much as to render the data
fully deidentified. For example, HIPAA allows for the disclosure of limited
datasets. In contrast to fully deidentified datasets, limited datasets can include
much more geographic information, including city, county, and ZIP code. These
data permit analyses that would not be possible under fully deidentified data;
however, limited datasets are often still viewed as “identifiable” data and HIPAA
rules still apply.221 Similarly, the Common Rule permits an exemption from some
requirements where researchers record otherwise identifiable data in such a
manner that data subjects cannot be identified.222 Other laws, like GDPR, do not
expressly provide less restrictive provisions for less identifiable data, but instead
cite pseudonymization as a method to meet legal requirements for use,
disclosure, or secure maintenance of data.223
Turning to the UPDPA and CAVACO statutes, the UPDPA’s three
219 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 4(5).
220 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e).
221 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e).
222 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4).
223 See, e.g., 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 89 (citing pseudonymization as an example for a data
safeguard that can be used when disclosing information for research or public interest purposes).
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categories of data identifiability are personal data, deidentified data, and nonidentified data. Personal data are the central focus of the Act. A data record is
“personal data” if it “direct[ly] identif[ies]”224 the data subject or if it has been
“pseudonymized,” meaning that it does not directly identify the subject but “can
be reasonably linked to a data subject’s identity or is maintained to allow
individualized communication with, or treatment of, the data subject.”225 The
three CAVACO statutes define “personal data” in ways similar, but not quite
identical, to the UPDPA.226 All include pseudonymized data in personal data.
In practice, the UPDPA employs the term “pseudonymized” in only three
places: eliminating the controller’s responsibility to provide the data subject a
copy of data if the data are “pseudonymized and not maintained with sensitive
data”;227 defining the creation of pseudonymized data as a compatible data
practice;228 and prohibiting reidentification of pseudonymized data unless certain
conditions are met.229
The CAVACO statutes introduce an additional requirement to the definition
of pseudonymized data: “that the additional information is kept separately and is
subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the personal
information is not attributed to an identified or identifiable consumer.”230 Given
that IRBs typically expect researchers to explain how they will achieve these
very tasks, the UPDPA and CAVACO statute definitions of pseudonymized data
do not appear more stringent than current research practices, though the UPDPA
might be less so.
“Deidentified data”—”personal data that is modified to remove all direct
identifiers and to reasonably ensure that the record cannot be linked to an
identified data subject by a person that does not have personal knowledge or
special access to the data subject’s information”231—is subject to some
224 “‘Direct identifier’ means information that is commonly used to identify a data subject,
including name, physical address, email address, recognizable photograph, and telephone number.”
UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(6).
225 “The term [pseudonymized] includes a record without a direct identifier if the record
contains an internet protocol address, a browser, software, or hardware identification code, a
persistent unique code, or other data related to a particular device. The term does not include
deidentified data.” UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(14).
226 CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(v)(1)(K); VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-575; CPA, supra note
4, § 6-1-1303(17) (identical to VCDPA).
227 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 5(a). To do otherwise would be exceptionally difficult because
the pseudonymization makes it difficult to know whose record belongs to who or whose needs
correction; and may actually compromise privacy more through the reidentification process.
228 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 7(b)(5).
229 Id. § 9(b).
230 CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(aa). Accord VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-575; CPA, supra
note 4, § 6-1-1303(22). This language mirrors the GDPR. See supra note 219.
231 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(5).
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restrictions under the UPDPA but is not its focus.232 Because deidentified data
are personal data that are modified, we can also think of them as “personal data,
but for the fact that they’ve been deidentified.” The California statute defines
“deidentified data” similarly to the UPDPA.233 Virginia and Colorado’s statutes
narrow the definition slightly, considering data to be deidentified only if it cannot
be linked to the data subject or “a device linked to” the data subject.234 These acts
probably thus consider indirect identifiers, such as IP and MAC addresses on
computers, sufficient to identify a data subject through a device linked to them.
The Colorado and California acts also require—in very similar language—
controllers and processors of deidentified data to take certain steps to keep it
from being reidentified.235
As noted above, deidentified data are practically difficult to keep that way.
In theory, statutes could specify standards for deidentification to resolve just this
issue, but neither the UPDPA nor the CAVACO statutes do so.236
The third data category of identifiability, one not actually named or
described in the UPDPA or CAVACO statutes, can be defined by elimination
and consists of data about entities other than human data subjects. These acts do
not regulate use of such “non-personal data.”
C. Data Sensitivity
Assuming that data records are identifiable, there is still a question of how
sensitive they are. The extant privacy acts appear to recognize at least three levels
of data record sensitivity: “sensitive” personal data, publicly available personal
data, and everything else, what we’ll call “general personal data.” Publicly
available data includes public government records and information “available to
the general public in widely distributed media,” including most widely available
websites, directories, media programs, and news media.237 “Sensitive data” is
232 Id. § 9(b) provides it is a “prohibited data practice to collect or create personal data by
reidentifying or causing the reidentification of pseudonymized or deidentified data.” The same
section provides some technical exceptions to that rule. Id.
233 CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(m).
234 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-575; CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1303(11).
235 CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(m); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1301(11). The UPDPA
practically includes similar provisions, but it does not tie them to the definition of “deidentified
data.” See UPDPA, supra note 4, § 9(b) (making it a prohibited practice for any regulated entity to
“collect or create personal data by reidentifying . . . deidentified data”); § 6(a) (requiring disclosure
in the controller’s privacy policy of uses); and § 4 (requiring controllers and processors to comply
with instructions of, and obligations laid on, collecting controllers).
236 Oddly, the Colorado statute, which already limits the duties of controllers and processors
where deidentified data are concerned, places data deidentified under the standards in 45 C.F.R.
164 entirely outside its application. § 6-1-1304(2)(g).
237 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(15).
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information in categories defined by the statute that are usually subject to greater
protections or more processing restrictions.238 General personal data is a catch-all
category that consists of personal data that is neither publicly available nor
sensitive.
The UPDPA recognizes these three levels of personal-data sensitivity. It
defines “publicly available information” to include public government records;
information “available to the general public in widely distributed media,”
including most widely available websites, directories, media programs, and news
media; information made available to the public lawfully; and observations of the
data subject made “from a publicly accessible location.”239 The UPDPA excludes
such data entirely from its protection, not considering them part of “personal
data.”240 Though the CAVACO statutes vary in their terms from the UPDPA,
they appear practically to have similar meanings, and they also exclude publicly
available information from their coverage.241
The UPDPA defines “sensitive data” as “personal data that reveals” any
information in a broad range of categories: “racial or ethnic origin, religious
belief, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, or immigration status”; “a credit or
debit card number or financial account number”; most government-issued
identification numbers, including SSN, taxpayer ID, etc.; present geolocation
coordinates; “diagnosis or treatment for a disease or health condition” or “genetic
sequencing information”; criminal records; and any “information about a data
subject the controller knows or has reason to know is under 13 years of age.”242 It
also includes a subject’s ID and password for services to be accessed remotely.243
Of these, criminal record and income are unique to the UPDPA. There are other
variations between the UPDPA and the CAVACO statutes and among them that
are interesting, but mostly minor.244
238 ALI’s principles do not define sensitive data categories, but the drafters nevertheless
claim that the principles are adaptable to concerns about sensitive data. PRINCIPLES OF DATA
PRIVACY, supra note 1, § 2 cmt. e. For a list of data categories considered sensitive under the
UPDPA and CAVACO statutes, see infra Section II(C).
239 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(15).
240 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(c).
241 CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(v)(2); VCPDA § 59.1-575; CPA, supra note 4, § 6-11303(17)(b). Note that Solow-Niederman expresses concern about the negative externalities of
processing of publicly-available data. Solow-Niederman, supra note 45, at 5, 31-38.
242 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(17).
243 Id. (“credentials sufficient to access an account remotely”).
244 The Virginia and Colorado statutes use almost identical language and are the least
expansive in covering sensitive data, not including account credentials; financial accounts and
credit and debit card numbers; Social security, taxpayer ID, driver’s license, or military
identification number; or geolocation. VCPDA § 59.1-575; CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1303(24).
California and Colorado cover “sex life,” while Virginia does not. CCPA, supra note 4,
§ 140(ae)(2)(c); VCPDA § § 59.1-575; CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1303(24). California alone covers
philosophical beliefs, union membership and “contents of a consumer’s mail, email, and text
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The “sensitive data” category varies in its importance in the statutes, as well.
Its key role in the UPDPA is to differentiate between cases where the data subject
must opt in to restricted data practices (called “incompatible data practices” in
the Act) involving sensitive data via “express consent in a signed record for each
practice.”245 The controller need only provide notice and the opportunity to optout of incompatible data practices using non-sensitive data.246 The significant
effect of the “sensitive” category under the California statute is that data subjects
have certain rights to restrict their use, though the statute expresses this in a
confused jumble of limitations and exceptions.247 The California act also
provides for specific means for the data subject to opt out of disclosure and
distribution of their sensitive data.248 Virginia and Colorado require consent for
any data practice involving sensitive data.249 Each also requires that controllers
and processors perform a “data protection assessment” for processing where
sensitive data are concerned.250
The third, catch-all category of data sensitivity, what we call “general
personal data,” is not named or defined in the UPDPA or CAVACO statutes, but
consists of personal data that is neither publicly available nor sensitive data.
D. Regulated Entity
Central to many data protection laws is a delineation of particular types of
data controllers or processors subject to the law, in other words, the regulated
entities. In comprehensive data protection laws, the definition of the regulated
entity is often broad. GDPR applies to processing of personal data by controllers
and processors established within the European Union—the location of the
regulated entity—and “personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a
messages unless the business is the intended recipient of the communication.” CCPA, supra note 4,
§ 140(ae)(1)(D)-(E). It also allows the listed to be extended by regulation. CCPA, supra note 4,
§ 185(a)(1). There are some variations in the identification of geolocation, biometric, and genetic
data among the statutes. UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(17); CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(ae)(1)(c),
(1)(f), (2)(a); VCPDA § 59.1-575; CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1303(24).
245 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 8(c).
246 The notice must be sufficient for the “data subject to understand the nature of the
incompatible data processing.” UPDPA, supra note 4, § 8(b). The UPDPA also affects the data
subject’s right to request a copy of data from a controller. Id. § 5(a).
247 See CCPA § 121. California also subjects a controller to greater disclosure obligations to
the data subject regarding the collection of sensitive data. CCPA, supra note 4, § 100(a)(2)-(3).
248 CCPA, supra note 4, § 135.
249 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(5); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(7).
250 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1309(2) (categorizing the processing of any sensitive data as
“processing that presents a heightened risk of harm to a consumer”); id. § 6-1-1309(1) (requiring
data protection assessments for practices that present a heightened risk); VCDPA, supra note 4,
§ 59.1-580(A)(4) (requiring data protection assesments for practies that involve the “processing of
senstivie data”)..
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controller or processor not established in the Union”—the location of the data
subject at the time of the processing.251 GDPR also defines some entities that are
not regulated (e.g., natural persons engaged with personal or household
activities).252 In existing U.S. federal laws, the limited scope of separate statutes
results in the sectorial “patchwork” of regulation, which is not particularly
analytically useful with the comprehensive state statutes discussed here. The
newer statutes do a more thorough job of conceptually identifying various
controllers and processors in the “pipeline” of data processing.253
Importantly, U.S. data protection laws are not mutually exclusive when it
comes to the defined regulated entities. For example, most entities regulated as
substance-abuse treatment programs are also HIPAA-covered entities.
Consequently, they have to comply with HIPAA and the 42 CFR Part 2
regulations. This also creates complexities between federal and state regulatory
approaches. For example, health information exchange organizations are
regulated under HIPAA as business associates of covered entities,254 but in 2016,
thirty-one states had privacy laws specifically regulating health information
exchanges.255 When different data protection laws overlap on a single regulated
entity, it can be especially difficult to determine which legal provisions apply and
which policies to implement to ensure compliant data practices.
Turning to the UPDPA, at its broadest level, it applies to any person—
whether individual or legal entity256—that is a controller or processor of personal
data, provided the controller or processor “conducts business in [the adopting]
state or produces products or provides services purposefully directed to residents
of” the adopting state.257 Like the CAVACO statutes, the UPDPA excludes from
its effect the adopting state and any “agency or instrumentality . . . or a political
subdivision” of it.258 Not-for-profit enterprises may or may not be covered,
251 2016 O.J. (L 119), art. 3.
252 Id. art. 1–2, 18.
253 See text accompanying notes 183–190.
254 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2021).
255 Cason D. Schmit, Sarah A. Wetter & Bita A. Kash, Falling Short: How State Laws Can
Address Health Information Exchange Barriers and Enablers, 25 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N
635, 635–644 (2018).
256 The definition of “person” includes both individuals and entities but excludes any “public
corporation or government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.” UPDPA,
supra note 4, § 2(9).
257 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(a).
258 Id. § 3(b); see CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(d)(1) (defining “business”—the entities
regulated under the act—as any “sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company,
corporation, association, or other legal entity that is organized or operated for the profit or financial
benefit of its shareholders or other owners,” thus implicitly excluding government entities);
VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-576(B) (withholding application from “body, authority, board,
bureau, commission, district, or agency of the Commonwealth or of any political subdivision of the
Commonwealth”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-102 (West 2021) (defining, for purposes of CPA,
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depending on state-law determinations about what counts as “conducting
business.” The Colorado act is silent on that matter. California, meanwhile,
defines the businesses to which CCPA applies as those “organized or operated
for the profit or financial benefit of its shareholders or other owners,” seemingly
excluding non-profits.259 Virginia’s act expressly excludes from its application
any non-profit organization260 or “institution of higher education.”261
Like the CAVACO statutes, the UPDPA has certain size thresholds for
regulated entities. A controller or processor that “maintains personal data about
more than [50,000] data subjects who are residents of this state”262 or that “earns
more than [50] percent of its gross annual revenue during a calendar year from
maintaining personal data as a controller or processor” is fully subject to the
UPDPA.263 It’s up to each enacting state to fill in the bracketed thresholds.264
Similarly, the California Consumer Privacy Act applies to a smaller entity if it
“[d]erives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from selling or sharing
consumers’ personal information.”265 The Virginia Consumer Data Protection
Act and Colorado Privacy Act never apply to smaller controllers or processors.266
“person” as “an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated
association . . . , or any other legal or commercial entity,” again implicitly excluding government
entities).
259 CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(d)(1).
260 Defined as “any corporation organized under the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act . . .
or any organization exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3), 501(c)(6), or 501 (c)(12) of the
Internal Revenue Code.” VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (West 2021).
261 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-576(B)(iv)-(v) (West 2021).
262 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(a)(1) (“excluding data subjects whose data is collected or
maintained solely to complete a payment transaction”). Note that the square brackets in the quoted
language in the original. Whether a data subject is protected by a state’s adoption of the UPDPA
appears to be unrelated to whether the data subject is a resident of the adopting state. This is
because the definition of regulated entities noted above relates to whether the controller or
processor does business in the adopting state or purposefully directs its services to the state’s
residents and not whether any breach involves data records of a resident of the adopting state. See
the discussion, infra Section H, for implications in enforcement.
263 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(a)(2). A processor working for a controller or processor that
meets either of these size requirements is also held to be in this category. UPDPA, supra note 4,
§ 3(a)(3).
264 “The threshold numbers are in brackets [so] each State can determine the proper level of
applicability.” UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3 cmt.
265 CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(d)(1)(C). Otherwise, CCPA governs only larger controllers
and processors, those that have “annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars
($25,000,000) in the preceding calendar year” or that “annually buy[], sell[], or share[] the personal
information of 100,000 or more consumers or households.” Id. § 140(d)(1)(A)–(B).
266 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1304(1) (applying only to a controller or processor that
“controls or processes the personal data of one hundred thousand consumers or more . . . [or]
derives revenue . . . from the sale of personal data and processes or controls the personal data of
twenty-five thousand consumers or more”); VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-576(A) (processors and
controllers that “control or process personal data of at least 100,000 consumers or . . . control or
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Normatively, these acts are practically equivalent on the issue of covered
entities, but one concern under the UPDPA is its coverage of smaller players. A
controller or processor of any size is subject to the UPDPA if it engages in any of
the “restricted” or “incompatible” data practices described below.267 On the one
hand, it’s unclear how much expense smaller players will have to incur to
educate themselves about the Act so that they understand what they may do
without becoming subject to all of the UPDPA’s requirements. The result might
be widespread confusion, and a catastrophic implementation of the Act in a state
that affects small-business owners could sour legislators on the act in general. On
the other hand, exempting small controllers and processors—who likely make up
a large proportion of the players in this space—could leave much data entirely
unprotected, much as they are by the CAVACO statutes.
E. Data Practices
Our framework recognizes three types of data practices in which controllers
and processors may engage: favored, restricted, and prohibited data practices.
Favored and restricted data practices each have two subcategories. Those that are
favored may be disclosed or undisclosed and do not require data subject’s
consent; those that are restricted require the data subject’s consent, passively
through an opt-out or actively through an opt-in mechanism. Thus, permitted data
practices represent a continuum from those that least constrain the controller,
undisclosed favored; to those that most constrain it, active-consent restricted. All
other data practices are prohibited.
1.

Favored Data Practices

Generally, data protection laws will permit the use of collected data for
enumerated purposes without any consent from the data subjects other than their
choice to enter a relationship with the controller. These favored practices will
almost always include the primary data use, or the use for which the data was
collected. This “purpose limitation” often intends that “personal information
should be collected only for a specified purpose and not further processed in a
manner incompatible” with it.268 For example, HIPAA permits covered entities to
use protected information for treatment, payment, and healthcare operations.
Similarly, FERPA permits educational entities to use protected education records
for legitimate educational interests. These purposes align with reasonable datasubject expectations for the use of collected data.
process personal data of at least 25,000 consumers and derive over 50 percent of gross revenue
from the sale of personal data”).
267 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(a)(4).
268 PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 3.
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Data protection laws may also permit some secondary data uses—data
collected for one purpose but reused for another purpose—without a data
subject’s consent. Secondary data uses may be favored data practices if they
advance government interests, data subjects’ interests, or social interests. A
secondary data use could advance a government interest if it facilitates
government oversight or enforcement (e.g., fraud detection). Similarly, a
secondary data use could promote the data subject’s interest, as, for example,
when federal public assistance programs permit program data to be used to assess
a beneficiary’s eligibility for additional benefits. Finally, some laws permit some
secondary uses without consent to advance social interests, as when they permit
data to be used for research or public health purposes.269 All these favored uses
can be either disclosed, meaning that the collecting controller discloses—usually
in a privacy policy—that it will engage in the data practice, or undisclosed,
meaning that the controller does not disclose them.
The basic regime of the UPDPA is to permit what it calls “compatible data
practices” without consumer consent, though the collecting controller must
disclose those favored data practices in which it routinely engages in its privacy
policy. These are thus disclosed favored practices in our framework. There are
three bases upon which a data practice can be a compatible data practice under
the UPDPA. The most straightforward basis is for the practice to fall within an
enumerated list of compatible practices: section 7(b)–(c) of the Act. This includes
managing transactions between controller and data subject and managing
controller’s business—both part of the primary purposes for which the data are
collected—and permitting oversight of controller’s data practices, preventing or
investigating crime, complying with legal requirements, and defending against
legal claims—data practices that the drafters regarded as sufficiently integral to
the primary purposes of the data collection to warrant this status.270
The second basis upon which a data practice may be classified as compatible
under the UPDPA is if it entails “processing [that (1)] is consistent with the
ordinary expectations of data subjects or [(2)] is likely to benefit data subjects
substantially.”271 Note that elements (1) and (2) here are disjunctive, so either
will do. The Act offers six factors for assessing whether a particular data practice
would satisfy this requirement.272
269 Hulkower, supra note 15, 150–60; see generally Tara Ramanathan, Cason Schmit,
Akshara Menon & Chanelle Fox, The Role of Law in Supporting Secondary Uses of Electronic
Health Information, 43 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 48 (2021).
270 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 7(b).
271 Id. § 7(a).
272 Id. ((1) the data subject’s relationship with the controller; (2) the type of transaction in
which the personal data was collected; (3) the type and nature of the personal data that would be
processed; (4) the risk of a negative consequence on the data subject by the use or disclosure of the
personal data; (5) the effectiveness of a safeguard against unauthorized use or disclosure of the
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The third basis under the UPDPA for classifying a data practice as
compatible is in accordance with a voluntary consensus standard (VCS). This is a
formal standard that a controller or processor can adopt, developed (probably) by
an industry group in consultation with consumers and others, and approved by
the attorney general (or other privacy official designated by the enacting state).
As the VCS is a significant innovation of the UPDPA that provides value to
public health researchers and professionals, we treat it in more detail below.273
Under the UPDPA, the collecting controller must disclose in its privacy
policy any compatible data practices it or its authorized processors “appl[y]
routinely to personal data.”274 The UPDPA’s use of the word “routinely” seems
unnecessarily vague here. For example, a controller may disclose personal data
that provides evidence of criminal activity to a law enforcement agency without
listing this practice” if “this type of disclosure is unusual.”275 There is no
definition of “routinely” in the UPDPA, and it does not appear in other uniform
acts of the ULC. Even Black’s struggles to define “routine practice” without
appeal to the synonym “regular”: “A customary action or procedure that is
regularly followed; a habitual method adhered to as a matter of regularity.”276
The California act does not require specific consent for data practices
“reasonably necessary and proportionate to achieve the purposes for which the
personal information was collected or processed, or for another disclosed purpose
that is compatible with the context in which the personal information was
collected.”277 It does require that the collecting controller disclose the categories
of personal information (including sensitive data), its expected uses, and the
duration of its retention.278 Virginia and Colorado also require these
disclosures279 and do not require consent for “collection of personal data to what
is adequate, relevant, and reasonably necessary in relation to the purposes for
which such data is processed, as disclosed to the consumer”280 or processing for
those purposes or for purposes “compatible” with them,281 provided the data are

personal data; and (6) the extent to which the practice advances the economic, health, or other
interests of the data subject.)
273 See infra Section II.G.
274 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 6(a)(3).
275 Id. § 6 cmt.
276 Routine Practice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
277 CCPA, supra note 4, § 100(c).
278 Id. § 100(a).
279 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(C); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(1) (using language
very similar to Virginia’s).
280 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(1); see also CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(3)
(using very similar language).
281 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(2): see also CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(4)
(using very similar language).
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not sensitive.282
The UPDPA and the CAVACO statutes differ from each other somewhat in
their overt treatment of public health. The UPDPA classifies as a compatible data
practice—a disclosed favored practice—one that “permits analysis . . . to
discover insights related to public health, public policy, or other matters of
general public interest and does not include use of personal data to make a
prediction or determination about a particular data subject.”283 This provision
also appears to permit public health surveillance and development of population
interventions to protect public health, but it specifically excludes individualized
interventions.284 California establishes a narrow undisclosed favored practice for
public health: Reidentification of deidentified records for public health purposes
and for research subject to the Common Rule.285 Colorado, on the other hand,
offers a broad permission for public health practices, providing that the act does
not “restrict a controller’s or processor’s ability . . . to process personal data for
reasons of public interest in the area of public health, but solely to the extent that
the processing . . . (a) is subject to suitable and specific measures to safeguard the
rights of the consumer whose personal data are processed; and (b) is under the
responsibility of a professional subject to confidentiality obligations under
federal, state, or local law.”286 This is also an undisclosed favored practice in our
framework. The California and Virginia acts treat public health practices as
restricted data practices, thus requiring consent, though the consent need only be
passive (opt out) in California’s case but must be active (opt in) in Virginia’s.
See the next subsection for further discussion.
2.

Restricted Data Practices

Restricted data practices are those that require the data subject’s consent.
There are two subsets of restricted data practices: passive consent and active
consent. They represent default states for data practices. In passive consent, the
data subject is presumed to consent unless they opt out; in active consent, the
data subject is presumed not to consent unless they opt in. There may also be
heightened requirements for notice and more formal requirements for consent for

282 See VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(5).
283 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 7(b)(6)(A). In fact, the controller has to disclose the data use
only if it is “routine.”
284 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 7 cmt. (A compatible practice “would include the use of personal
data to initially train an AI or machine learning algorithm. However, subsequent use of such an AI
or machine learning algorithm in order to make a prediction or decision about a data subject . . .
must comply with this act through another provision.”).
285 CCPA, supra note 4, § 148(a)(2), (3).
286 Id. § 6-1-1304(3)(a)(xi).
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some restricted data practices.287
The UPDPA refers to restricted data practices as “incompatible data
practices.”288 Despite their name, the UPDPA does not prohibit them, instead
merely requiring the data subject’s consent. There is considerable variation in the
acts’ determinations of which restricted data practices are passive-consent,
permitting data subjects to opt out, and active-consent, requiring data subjects to
opt in. The UPDPA and California require active consent in the smallest class of
cases, while Virginia and Colorado appear to require active consent in a broad
class of cases.
Considering passive consent first, when the data controller collects data for
an incompatible data practice under the UPDPA, the subject must be informed
and have a chance to opt out.289 The California act provides a data subject an optout right to “to direct a business that sells or shares personal information about
the consumer to third parties” without regard to the reason for which the
controller is selling or sharing data.290 Similarly, uses of sensitive data outside
those that are favored give rise to a data subject’s right to opt out in California.291
Virginia and Colorado provide that data subjects may opt out of “(i) targeted
advertising, (ii) the sale of personal data, or (iii) profiling in furtherance of
decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the
consumer.”292 Based on these provisions, a controller will have to provide at the
287 And there may be a variety of kinds of consent. As background, 2017 revisions to the
Common Rule introduced a new type of consent, called “broad consent.” Revised Common Rule
FAQs,
HHS.GOV
OFFICE
FOR
HUMAN
RESEARCH
PROTECTIONS,
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/education-and-outreach/revised-common-rule/revised-common-rule-qand-a/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZXE9-LCHC] (last visited Feb. 12, 2022). This new provision
allows researchers to solicit consent that covers a broad range of potential research applications. Id.
Rather than seeking specific consent for each new research project. Anecdotally, we believe that
IRBs are struggling to practically implement a “broad consenting” process and that it is
consequently an underutilized legal tool. It may be that “consent” in most commercial settings—
click-through privacy policies—is a lot like a broad consent but without the rigor of IRB review.
288 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 8(a) (defining the term by process of elimination, labeling data
practices that are not compatible or prohibited “incompatible,” and also including violations of a
privacy policy).
289 Id. § 8(b); see also UPDPA, supra note 4, § 6 (requiring a collecting controller to have a
privacy policy that identifies categories and purpose of data it maintains and distributes to others
and identifies all incompatible data practices it will apply unless the consumer opts out).
290 CCPA, supra note 4, §§ 120(a), 115(d). The act’s authorization of regulations, however,
suggests that the reasons might be spelled out. § 185(a)(19)(A)(vi). See also CCPA, supra note 4,
§ 120(b) (requiring a controller to disclose any selling or sharing of data in which it engages).
291 CCPA, supra note 4, § 121(a). See also id. § 135 (detailing methods for providing this opt
out).
292 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-577(A)(5); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1306(1)(a)(i) (using
identical language). “‘Targeted advertising’ means displaying advertisements to a consumer where
the advertisement is selected based on personal data obtained from that consumer’s activities over
time and across nonaffiliated websites or online applications to predict such consumer’s
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least notice and an opportunity to opt out before providing data for public health
practices or research if they cannot be considered favored practices but are
instead restricted practices. Practically speaking, this is not much more of an
impediment than that imposed for disclosed favored practices: With passive
consent, the default is participation, and harried data subjects are unlikely even to
notice that they may opt out. However, in contrast to disclosed favored practices,
data controllers seeking to share passive-consent data for public health have
implementation costs to develop systems and workflows to collect, manage, and
enforce opt-out preferences.
But the UPDPA and the California and Virginia acts include some data
practices that require active consent. The Virginia statute provides that all data
practices beyond the favored ones described above, and any processing involving
sensitive data, are subject to the data subject’s consent.293 As it defines consent as
“a clear affirmative act signifying a consumer’s . . . agreement to process
personal data relating to the consumer,”294 this appears to be an opt-in form of
consent. The Colorado statute’s requirements are similar, but it classifies public
health activities as favored practices that do not require consent. In California, a
very small class of cases—where the controller wants to enroll the data subject in
“into a financial incentive program”295—are subject to active consent. Under the
UPDPA, only where sensitive data296 are concerned must the data subject consent
specifically to each incompatible data practice.297
preferences or interests.” VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-575; see also CPA, supra note 4, § 6-11301(25) (adopting very similar language. “‘Profiling’ means any form of automated processing
performed on personal data to evaluate, analyze, or predict personal aspects related to an identified
or identifiable natural person’s economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests,
reliability, behavior, location, or movements.” VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-575; see also CPA,
supra note 4, § 6-1-1301(20) (adopting nearly identical language).
293 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(2), (5); see also CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(4),
(7) (using very similar language).
294 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-575; see also CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1303(5) (using very
similar language). California appears at first to define consent more broadly as “any freely given,
specific, informed, and unambiguous indication of the consumer’s wishes by which the
consumer . . . , including by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the
processing of personal information relating to the consumer for a narrowly defined particular
purpose.” CCPA, supra note 4, § 140(h). The “including” before “by a statement or by a clear
affirmative action” suggests there are other possibility. The section proceeds to provide that
“[a]cceptance of a general or broad terms of use, or similar document, that contains descriptions of
personal information processing along with other, unrelated information, does not constitute
consent. Hovering over, muting, pausing, or closing a given piece of content does not constitute
consent. Likewise, agreement obtained through use of dark patterns does not constitute consent.”
Id. See generally Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 43 (2021) (providing an explanation and analysis of dark patterns).
295 CCPA, supra note 4, § 1798.125(b)(3).
296 See supra Section II(C).
297 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 8(c).
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Prohibited Data Practices

Prohibited data practices are those practices that are never permitted. The
CAVACO statutes do not define prohibited data practices, except to the extent
that prohibition arises from going beyond what is permitted in favored and
restricted practices.298 In contrast, the UPDPA expressly describes several
prohibited data practices.299 As a preliminary matter, the UPDPA makes it a
prohibited practice to reidentify deidentified data, subject to certain exceptions.300
This Section thus brings deidentified data within the UPDPA’s scope, but only to
the extent that a processor attempts to reidentify it. The UPDPA inventories other
categories of prohibited data practices into three groups: breaking rules
elsewhere, personal harms, and security harms. The Act prohibits data processing
if the processor engages in processing that would otherwise be a restricted
(“incompatible”) data practice and fails to get the data subject’s consent.301
The UPDPA also makes it a prohibited data practice to process personal data
in a manner that would “constitute a violation of other law, including federal or
state law against discrimination.”302 The Virginia and Colorado acts contain
similar prohibitions.303
The personal harms against which the UPDPA protects data subjects arise
from data practices likely to “subject a data subject to specific and significant:
(A) financial, physical, or reputational harm; (B) embarrassment, ridicule,
intimidation, or harassment; or (C) physical or other intrusion on solitude or
seclusion.”304 These UPDPA strictures could have effect on some public health
practices.305 For example, individualized public health interventions might under
certain circumstances have the negative effects described in the UPDPA. The
CAVACO statutes do not call out these particular harms as relating to prohibited
data practices, again, because they do not specifically define prohibited practices.
The security harms against which the UPDPA protects data subjects arise
from data practices likely to “result in misappropriation of personal data to
assume another’s identity,” or “fail to provide reasonable data-security
measures.”306 The CAVACO statutes imply similar requirements in their overall
use limitations and in their requirements for risk assessments.307
298 See, e.g., CCPA, supra note 4, §§ 100(a), 100(c), 120(d), 121(b).
299 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 9(a).
300 Id. § 9(b).
301 Id. § 9(a)(5).
302 Id. § 9(a)(3).
303 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(4); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(6).
304 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 9(a)(1).
305 See infra Part III.
306 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 9(a)(2), (4).
307 CCPA, supra note 4, § 1798.185(a)(15); VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-580; CPA, supra
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F. Other Requirements of Controllers and Processors
Recall that a smaller data controller or processor that engages only in
compatible data practices is not bound to meet any other requirements under the
UPDPA.308 As for the larger controller or processor, or the smaller one that
wishes to engage in incompatible data practices, the UPDPA’s key requirements
are to engage in incompatible data practices only with the data subject’s consent
(opt-in or opt-out, depending on data-content sensitivity) and not to engage in
prohibited data practices. The UPDPA imposes other obligations on these data
controllers and processors. They fall into three categories: offering a public
privacy policy, responding to data subject’s requests, and performing data risk
assessments.
The UPDPA requires that a controller make its privacy policy available in
two ways: First, it must be “reasonably available to a data subject at the time
personal data is collected about the subject,” and second, the controller must post
its privacy policy on its website, if it has one.309 The CAVACO statutes do not
impose the latter requirement. As for the contents of privacy policies, they fall
into two categories, one relating to the controller’s data practices and the other to
the procedures and laws under which it operates. The UPDPA and the CAVACO
statutes have similar requirements for privacy policies regarding data practices,
discussed above.310 Where procedures and laws are concerned, the UPDPA and
the CAVACO statutes require that the privacy policy provide “the procedure for
a data subject to exercise a right” requiring the controller’s response.311 Under the
UPDPA, the controller must also identify “federal, state, or international privacy
laws or frameworks with which the controller complies,” and explain whether the
controller has adopted “any voluntary consensus standard.”312
The second major category of responsibilities for data controllers under the
UPDPA and CAVACO statutes involves responding to requests from data
subjects, including requests for copies of data, for correcting data, and for
deleting data. The collecting controller is principally responsible here because it
has (or had) a relationship with the data subject at the time of collection. The
collecting controller is responsible for providing to a data subject a copy of their
personal data and correcting errors in the data.313 The data controller is
responsible for coordinating activities of processors and downstream controllers
note 4, § 6-1-1309.
308 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 3(a)(1)–(4).
309 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 6(b)-(c).
310 Supra Section II.F.
311 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 6(a)(5); accord VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(C); CPA,
supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(1)(a)(iii).
312 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 6(a)(5)-(7).
313 Id. §§ 4(a)(1)-(2), 5(a).
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to comply with these requirements, and those processors and controllers are
bound to cooperate.314 The controller may not retaliate against a data subject for
making any of these requests.315 California, Virginia, and Colorado all provide
that the controller must comply with a data subject request to delete personal
data.316 The UPDPA does not provide a right for the data subject to request the
deletion of personal data.317 Nevertheless, all four statutes provide some
individual rights that persist throughout the data processing lifecycle, which
some legal scholars argue is characteristic of the European GDPR.
The CAVACO statutes provide for a duty of care “to implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of
the information.”318 The UPDPA makes it a prohibited data practice to “fail to
provide reasonable data-security measures, including appropriate administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards to prevent unauthorized access.”319
The final major category of responsibility for data controllers and processors
under the UPDPA is that they must “conduct and maintain . . . a data privacy and
security risk assessment” that addresses risks, their characteristics, and efforts
taken to mitigate them.320 The California statute provides for regulations
addressing risk assessments, but regulations promulgated under the previous
version of the California Consumer Privacy Act do not address them, despite the
statutory requirement that they do so.321 Colorado and Virginia require
assessments for processing of sensitive data and some other data practices.322
Neither the UPDPA nor the CAVACO statutes directly require periodic updates
of risk assessments. Under the UPDPA, the controller or processor must update
314 Id. § 5(b).
315 Id. § 5(c). There are some special cases where the controller can change its relationship
with the data subject after changing data at the subject’s request or if the subject withholds consent
from an incompatible data practice. Id. §§ 5(c), 7(c), 8(c).
316 CCPA, supra note 4, § 105(a); VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-577; CPA, supra note 4,
§ 6-1-1306(1)(d). But see CCPA, supra note 4, § 105(d)(6) (providing that a controller need not
delete data records at the data subject’s request if the data are being processed for research to which
the subject consented and “deletion of the information is likely to render impossible or seriously
impair the ability to complete” the research).
317 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 4, official comment.
318 CCPA, supra note 4, § 150(a)(1). Accord VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(3); CPA,
supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(5).
319 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 9(a)(4).
320 Id. § 10(a).
321 CCPA, supra note 4, § 185(a)(15)(B) (requiring the California Attorney General to adopt
regulations by July 1, 2020, “requiring businesses whose processing of consumers’ personal
information presents significant risk to consumers’ privacy or security, to . . . [s]ubmit to the
California Privacy Protection Agency on a regular basis a risk assessment with respect to their
processing of personal information”). As of this writing, no such regulations appear to have been
promulgated.
322 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1309(2); VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-580(A).
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the assessment if “there is a change in the risk environment or in a data practice
that may materially affect the privacy or security of the personal data.”323
Language of the CAVACO statutes might be construed to require a new
assessment when similar changes occur.324
Among these provisions, only the right to deletion raises concerns for public
health, and then only if a significant proportion of data subjects request it.
G. The UPDPA Voluntary Consensus Standards
A marked innovation in the UPDPA is its use of VCSs. As one official
comment on the Act notes: “[H]ow these obligations are implemented may
depend on the particular business sector . . . . [a]nd consumers have vastly
different expectations about the use of their personal information depending on
the underlying transaction for which their data is sought.”325 According to the
UPDPA reporter, “[p]roviding an opportunity for industry sectors, in
collaboration with stakeholders including data subjects, to agree on methods of
implementing privacy obligations provides the flexibility any privacy legislation
will require.”326 The comment notes the apparent success of such standards under
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).327
In the UPDPA, the result is a process for groups of stakeholders to gather
and set baselines for particular industries or types of project. Such stakeholders
could include industry groups and public health researchers and professionals. In
brief, a group of “stakeholders”328 gathers to adopt a set of baselines relating to
various requirements of the Act, those not spelled out in the Act itself. For
example, what counts as a compatible data practice in a particular industry?329
The Act categorizes data practices by a controller or processor subject to a VCS
as “compatible data practices” if the VCS defines them so.330 How must a
controller obtain consent from data subjects when it is required?331 What are
industry-standard practices for responding to a consumer request for access to

323 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 10(a)-(b).
324 See VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-580; CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1309.
325 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 12, official comment.
326 Id.
327 Id. See also BBB NAT’L PROGRAMS, INC., TWENTY YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL COREGULATION UNDER COPPA:
A MODEL FOR FOSTERING CONSUMER PRIVACY (Oct. 2019), https://bbbnp-bbbp-stf-use101.s3.amazonaws.com/docs/default-source/whitepapers/bbb-np-report---20-years-of-coppa-selfregulation---10-15-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CBW-ULEM].
328 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 2(19).
329 Id. § 13(1).
330 Id. § 7(d).
331 Id. § 13(2).
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and correction of data?332 A controller must announce in its privacy policy that it
is complying with a VCS.333 A controller that adopts and complies with a VCS
setting out those standards is compliant with the UPDPA.334 This approach offers
a frank acknowledgment that data privacy is not a matter of one size fits all.335
Four sections of the UPDPA’s twenty sections, and a considerable
proportion of its word count, are dedicated to explaining the effect of VCSs, what
they contain, how they are developed, and how they are recognized by the
attorney general (or other privacy officer).336 Key for developing a VCS is that
the process must be open and deliberative in a way similar to ULC’s own
deliberative process, with “stakeholders representing a diverse range of industry,
consumer, and public interests,” and must give effort to hearing, responding to,
and resolving stakeholder concerns.337 The result does not have to be unanimous,
and stakeholders can file “statement[s] of dissent.”338 The attorney general must
be satisfied that the group adopted and followed a set of procedures to “provide
adequate notice of meetings and standards development.”339 The attorney general
evaluates requests to recognize a VCS according to rules the attorney general
adopts for the requests.340 If the attorney general recognizes the VCS, it becomes
a public record and thus usable by any regulated entity.341 The attorney general
can later withdraw recognition, if they determine the VCS “or its implementation
is not consistent with” the act.342
Practically speaking, there is nothing like VCSs in the CAVACO statutes.
There are provisions that enable some change and development, however. For
example, California’s act provides authority for the state’s privacy authority to
issue and maintain regulations that address changes in technology and providing
for many details of the relationship between controller and data subject.343 It
neither expressly permits nor forbids the industry-specific approach that the
VCSs contemplate. The Colorado act provides its attorney general a one-time
grant of authority to “adopt rules that govern the process of issuing opinion
letters and interpretive guidance to develop an operational framework for
332 Id. § 13(3).
333 Id. § 6(a)(7).
334 Id. § 12.
335 PRINCIPLES OF DATA PRIVACY, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that “uniformity and specificity is
not always desirable in light of the necessity for contextual shaping of [fair information practices]
in different areas of data use”).
336 UPDPA, supra note 4, §§ 12–15.
337 Id. § 14(1).
338 Id. § 14(1), (5).
339 Id. § 14(4).
340 Id. § 15(b).
341 Id. § 15(I).
342 Id. § 15(d).
343 CCPA, supra note 4, § 1798.185.
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business that includes a good faith reliance defense of an action that may
otherwise constitute a violation” of the act.344 Virginia provides no such
mechanisms.
For public health researchers and professionals, a VCS might prove a very
valuable way to identify as many of their data practices as possible as being
either exempt from the UPDPA or as being disclosed favored practices, what the
UPDPA calls “compatible data practices.”
H. Enforcement and Penalties
Typically, the remedies and penalties under a statute and who can enforce it
are determined by the statute. Professor Cohen describes—and criticizes—
conventional enforcement strategies broadly as “private remedial litigation
initiated by affected individuals and public enforcement action initiated by
agencies.” In practice, these penalties can consist of civil damages, civil
penalties, injunctions, and criminal penalties. Professor Cohen proposes three
alternatives to these conventional approaches that she argues could lead to more
impactful enforcement of privacy violations: 1) deputizing online intermediaries
to discipline actors within their information ecosystems, 2) disgorgement of
profits that accrue from privacy violations, and 3) permitting senior executives to
be held personally liable for privacy violations. However, none of Professor
Cohen’s alternatives—or criminal penalties for that matter—play a significant
role in the statutes we discuss in in this Article.
The UPDPA assumes that the adopting state’s attorney general (or the state
data privacy officer that the adopting state substitutes for the attorney general in
the Uniform Act) will have a significant role in enforcement of the Act and
adoption of VCSs.345 As for enforcement authority, though, that depends on the
adopting state’s consumer protection act, which the UPDPA cross-references for
“enforcement authority, remedies, and penalties” under the Act.346 In some states,
this may mean that only the state attorney general may enforce the act, that only
the attorney general and local district attorneys may enforce the Act, or that
affected data subjects might have their own private rights of action against
controllers and processors. Similar variability exists regarding remedies and
penalties.
The CAVACO statutes do not take a single approach, either. California
provides for a private civil right of action, with actual damages or statutory
damages between $100 and $750 per consumer per incident,347 and power for its
344 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1313(3).
345 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 16.
346 Id. § 16(a).
347 CCPA, supra note 4, § 150(a).
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privacy authority to enforce the act administratively, with penalties of $2,500 per
incident348 Both the privacy authority and private litigants can seek injunctions.349
Virginia allows only its attorney general to enforce its act, seeking injunction,
civil penalties up to $7,500 per violation, or both.350 Colorado provides that its
attorney general and district attorneys can bring actions, with remedies the same
as Colorado’s statute governing deceptive trade practices.351
I. Interaction with Other Statutes
The UPDPA and CAVACO statutes have certain exclusions from their
coverage grounded in federal laws, while the UPDPA takes an unusual approach
to other states’ laws. The UPDPA takes a different approach to federal privacy
laws than the CAVACO statutes. the UPDPA provides that a “controller or
processor complies with [the Act] with regard to processing” if they are
compliant with any of six federal statutes: HIPAA, Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Driver’s Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA), FERPA, and COPPA, all of which we discussed above.352 In the
patchwork metaphor, The UPDPA is the blanket laid behind the patches that
these federal laws represent. In this “two-ply” protection, if a controller or
processor complies with the applicable federal law, it is also complying with the
UPDPA. If it violates the federal law, it may also violate the UPDPA.353
The CAVACO statutes take different—dare we say “patchwork”?—
approaches to the federal laws. California carves out several exceptions, some of
them relating to controllers and processors, some relating to types of personal
data, and some relating to particular data practices. It excludes controllers and
processors that are “provider[s] of health care” and medical information subject
to HIPAA;354 it excludes personal data that are “collected, processed, sold, or
disclosed” pursuant or subject to GLBA and DPPA;355 and it excludes data
practices governed by the FCRA.356 Similarly, Virginia carves out entities and
data subject to GLBA and HIPAA;357 data subject to the DPPA, FERPA, and the
Farm Credit Act;358 and data practices subject to FCRA.359 And Colorado
348 Id. § 155(b).
349 Id. §§ 155(b), 199.90(a).
350 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-584(A), (C).
351 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1311(1).
352 See UPDPA, supra note 4, § 11(a), (b). Virginia takes the same approach with COPPA.
353 Subject to a pre-emption analysis.
354 CCPA, supra note 4, § 145(a)(1-2).
355 Id. § 145(e), (f).
356 CCPA, supra note 4, § 145(d).
357 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-576(B)(ii), (B)(iii), (C)(1)
358 Id. § 59.1-576(C)(11)–(13).
359 Id. § 59.1-576(C)(10).
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excludes some healthcare information and data subject to HIPAA360 and data
subject to GLB, DPPA, COPPA, and FERPA;361 data practices subject to
FCRA;362 and controllers subject to GLBA.363 In the CAVACO states, these
personal data, processors, and practices are simply not covered by their statutes:
They rely entirely on the cited federal acts to govern these types of data practices,
in contrast to the UPDPA in enacting states, which provides the two-ply
protection mentioned above. Neither the UPDPA nor the CAVACO statutes give
a pass to controllers and processors complying with privacy provisions of other
federal laws not named here.
The UPDPA is different from the CAVACO statutes in another way: It is
attentive to the laws of other states. The UPDPA expressly directs courts
“applying and construing” the Act that they should “consider the promotion of
uniformity of the law among jurisdictions that enact it.”364 The UPDPA also
includes a bootstrap provision that allows a controller or processor to seek from
the adopting state’s attorney general (or designated privacy officer) a
determination that complying with another jurisdiction’s privacy law provides
equal or greater protections than the adopting state’s UPDPA.365 Thus, a
controller working in California and the adopting state might ask the attorney
general in the adopting state to conclude that its compliance with the California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 and California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 is
sufficient to meet the requirements of the adopting state’s implementation of the
UPDPA.366 The CAVACO statutes are silent on the laws of other states.

360 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1304(2)(I(e).
361 Id. § 6-1-1304(2)(j).
362 Id. § 6-1-1304(2)(i).
363 Id. § 6-1-1304(2)(q).
364 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 18. It also requires the attorney general (or other privacy officer)
to “consider the need to promote predictability and uniformity among the states and give
appropriate deference to a voluntary consensus standard developed . . . and recognized by a
privacy-enforcement agency in another state,” id. § 15(c), and to “consider the need to promote
predictability for data subjects, controllers, and processors, and uniformity among the states” when
considering adopting rules under the act, id. § 16(c).
365 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 11(a).
366 This is an arguable contention on the data controller or processor’s part because, as this
Article has shown, there are respects in which the CCPA does not cover personal data, regulated
entities, or data practices quite the same way as UPDPA. The attorney general may set a fee for
providing that this determination “reflect[s] the cost reasonably expected to be incurred . . . to
determine” whether the other jurisdiction’s law is good enough.” Id. The UPDPA’s drafters
conclude that the attorney general would then be able to enforce the other jurisdiction’s law against
any controller or processor that had asserted another jurisdiction’s privacy regime as a “substitute”
for the adopting state’s UPDPA. UPDPA, supra note 4, § 11, official comment (“Adoption of this
act confers on the state attorney general, or other privacy data enforcement agency, authority not
only to enforce the provisions of this act but also to enforce the provisions of any other privacy
regime that a company asserts . . . as a substitute for compliance with this act.”).
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For public health researchers and professionals, the UPDPA’s goal of
uniformity is critically valuable. Though there are certainly public health projects
based in single states, many research projects and interventions seek to operate
across the country. If a state-by-state patchwork of non-uniform privacy laws
supplements the substantive patchwork of federal privacy laws, public health
researchers and professionals face the very real challenge of complying with an
ever-larger number of regulatory regimes.367
III. EVALUATION AND INTERVENTIONS
We have so far provided a conceptual framework for data protection and
analyzed how the enacted CAVACO statutes and the proposed UPDPA fit into
that framework. This Part first briefly considers how these statutes relate to some
of the normative assertions in the privacy-law literature.368 It then evaluates how
these statutes’ provisions advance and impede public health work within our
normative framework369 and suggests ways that public health researchers and
professionals should intervene to improve the situation in the coming months and
years.
A. The UPDPA and the CAVACO Statutes vs. Normative Privacy Frames
As we noted above, the copious literature relating to data protection and
privacy law in the United States casts a critical eye on the existing patchwork of
laws. As a preliminary matter, we do not see evidence in the UPDPA and the
Colorado and Virginia statutes that they have adopted the GDPR as their model,
but neither do we see them adopting the California statute as a model, as
Professors Chander, Kaminski, and McGeveran suggested they would. Among
other things, Professors Chander, Kaminski, and McGeveran made much of the
facts that the GDPR and California statutes differ greatly in length, with a
“paperback of the GDPR run[ning] some 130 pages” and the CCPA being
“around 25 pages”;370 that the CCPA “affords individuals little control”
compared to the GDPR’s “data protection” model;371 that the CCPA does not
provide private rights of action for individuals, while the GDPR did;372 that the
GDPR spelled out broad principles, while the CCPA provided much more
specific enforcement mechanisms;373 and that “the backdrop against which these
367 See supra Section I.B.
368 See supra Section I.C.
369 See Id.
370 Chander et al., supra note 75, at 1746.
371 Id. at 1757.
372 Id. at 1759.
373 Id. at 1760.
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two privacy laws were enacted, or . . . their legal setting, differs significantly,”
particularly as a result of First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.374
Taking at face value the differences that Professors Chander, Kaminski, and
McGeveran identified between the GDPR and CCPA, the Colorado and Virginia
statutes and the UPDPA appear to exhibit as much difference from the CCPA as
CCPA does from the GDPR. Of course, all the American acts arose in a similar
“legal setting.” As for length, however, the California act (after the 2020
referendum amendments) weighs in at more than 24,000 words, while Virginia’s
is around 6,000 words, Colorado’s is under 8,300, and the UPDPA comes in
under 4,800.375 We have noted376 a considerable number of differences between
California on the one hand and Virginia and Colorado on the other, including
several places where Colorado’s statutes followed Virginia’s verbatim.
Nevertheless, we have also noted that the UPDPA departs from approaches that
the CAVACO states use, both some on which the CAVACO states agree and
some on which they differ. As we also noted above,377 California does provide a
private right of action, though only for breaches of data security,378 but Virginia
and Colorado do not provide any private right of action at all.379 The UPDPA, on
the other hand, defers to the adopting state’s consumer protection act, which the
UPDPA cross-references for “enforcement authority, remedies, and penalties”
under the act,380 and which may or may not provide a private right of action.
Chander et al. concluded that “GDPR’s vagueness is arguably deliberate,”
and that “EU authorities wanted to allow companies and sectors to fill in details
of how to comply with the law over time, whether formally by establishing codes
of conduct or certification mechanism . . . or informally through selfregulation . . . .”381 Our description above382 of the voluntary consensus standard
that is integral to the UPDPA sounds more like the GDPR than the CCPA here,
as VCSs allow for industry groups to build customized substantive and
procedural regimes under the UPDPA that differ from each other.
In summary, we don’t have space here fully to explore the question, but we
expect that there is a new set of practical norms coalescing around discussions
associated with the Virginia, Colorado, and Uniform Law Commission statutes,
374 Id. at 1761.
375 Indeed, even the difference between the CCPA and GDPR may not be as great as Chander
et al. suggested, as the GDPR’s operative provisions are under 31,000 words, with a considerable
portion of its length consisting of more than 24,000 words of recitals.
376 Supra Section II.E.
377 Supra Section II.E.
378 CCPA, supra note 4, § 1798.150(a).
379 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-584(A), (C); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1311(1).
380 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 16(a).
381 Chander et al., supra note 75, at 1760.
382 Supra Section II.G.
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as they were being developed at the same time in 2020 and 2021. In any event,
the new practical normative model of the UPDPA, if it is new, clearly still
embraces the “notice and choice” model already at the heart of the U.S.
patchwork of sectoral privacy laws, as opposed to an information fiduciary
model, for example. The CAVACO statutes and the UPDPA in some ways do
exhibit the “follow the data” data-protection characteristic of GDPR that Chander
et al. use when distinguishing it from the California model: The UPDPA
regulates “data practices” and includes some as “prohibited,” which cannot be
consented to. In any event, these acts are thus unlikely to satisfy the expectations
of scholars who are asking for more. Though, as we shall see, these acts set some
defaults in a way that favors public goods—namely public health—some other
defaults they set generally favor commercial uses of the kind that we found
consumers comparatively disfavor.
Colorado and Virginia come closest to requiring opt-in, active consent for
the data practices that consumers appear to disfavor.383 As we noted above,384
these statutes do not require consent for “collection of personal data to what is
adequate, relevant, and reasonably necessary in relation to the purposes for which
such data is processed, as disclosed to the consumer”385 or processing for those
purposes or for purposes “compatible” with them,386 provided the data are not
sensitive.387 They require passive consent for certain uses, including “(i) targeted
advertising, (ii) the sale of personal data, or (iii) profiling in furtherance of
decisions that produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning the
consumer.”388 But they require active consent, an opt-in, for almost all other data
practices. The California and the UPDPA laws require active consent in the
smallest number of cases: In California, only where the controller wants to enroll
the data subject in “into a financial incentive program”;389 and under the UPDPA,
only where sensitive data are concerned.390 Given the default choices for
consumers under these acts, they do little to address the concerns we identified
above.391
These acts also do nothing to address the use of publicly available
383 Supra Section I.C.3.
384 Supra Section II.E.
385 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(1); see also CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(3)
(using very similar language).
386 VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(2): see also CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1308(4)
(using very similar language).
387 See VCDPA, supra note 4, § 59.1-578(A)(5).
388 Id. § 59.1-577(A)(5); CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1306(1)(a)(i). See also supra Section II.E
(discussing favored, restricted, and prohibited data practices).
389 CCPA, supra note 4, § 1798.125(b)(3).
390 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 8(c).
391 Supra Section I.C.
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information, which critics have noted can function to profile data subjects in
ways they could not expect and to which they would likely not consent.392 As for
personal data that are covered, the UPDPA and California acts do provide some
implied and express limitations on inferential data practices, which some have
argued are not adequately addressed in current laws.393 Neither the UPDPA nor
the CAVACO statutes heed Professor Cohen’s call for updated enforcement
mechanisms. Finally, none of these acts overtly establishes an “information
fiduciary” model, though they do take some steps to manage the information
pipeline that begins with the collecting controller. For example, as we noted
above,394 each act requires the collecting controller to provide copies of data to
subjects, to correct errors in the data, and to employ reasonable security
measures; and the collecting controller is responsible for imposing those
requirements on processors and third-party controllers downstream. The
CAVACO acts, but not the UPDPA, also give the data subject a right to have
data deleted.
Given our goal of addressing public health concerns under these statutes, we
turn now to an evaluation of them from that perspective, providing
recommendations for public health researchers and practitioners to intervene.
B. Helping and Hindering Public Health Activities
This Section considers whether the UPDPA and CAVACO statutes help or
hinder public health activities. After giving a brief overview, it examines the real
and perceived barriers that data privacy laws can create and then examines the
effects of these statues on data practices for research and on public health
practices. As a preliminary matter, public health researchers and professionals
must claim a seat at the table during deliberations on comprehensive data privacy
or protection statutes, whether at the state or federal level. Legislators in general
are not experts in public health and are not well situated to evaluate the effects of
legislative proposals on public health. Other private and public interest groups
are generally very skilled at advancing their objectives with legislatures, but
those objectives may not fully support public health activities. Interventions by
392 See supra Section I.C.2.
393 See Id. CCPA covers includes in covered personal data any “[i]nferences drawn from . . .
[personal information] to create a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences,
characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and
aptitudes.” CCPA, supra note 4, § 1798.140(o)(1)(K). The UPDPA may attempt to address this by
limiting the use of personal data “to make a prediction or determination about a particular data
subject,” making it one of the factors used to determine whether a data practice is a favored (i.e.,
compatible) data practice. Nevertheless, this UPDPA provision likely does not go as far as
Professor Solow-Niederman might like, as the UPDPA applies to only to identifiable and
pseudonymized data.
394 Supra Section II.F.
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public health researchers and professionals matter. For example, in June 2021,
the authors wrote a letter to the ULC committee developing the UPDPA—
effectively in the eleventh hour of the committee’s work, as it planned to
introduce the final UPDPA to the full Commission in July—urging changes to
support public health.395 The committee made some of those changes, and the
committee’s reporter credited the letter for prompting them.396
From a normative perspective, transparency and autonomy for data subjects
are probably well-protected under all four statutes for IRB-approved research
where the data are collected for the primary purpose of research, as such research
protocols typically require voluntary participation and consent or similar
protections. The UPDPA and Virginia acts cover data in research that makes
secondary use of data and in some public health practices.397 From the data
subject’s perspective, this may be desirable, but it may create impediments to
public health practice and research by bringing them within the purview of the
acts. The California and Colorado acts exempt the greatest swaths of data,
diminishing to some extent the data subjects’ autonomy but removing barriers to
public health research that makes secondary use of data and to public health
practice. Exempting public health practice and research from the coverage of the
UPDPA and the CAVACO statutes is only one way the acts might encourage
public health, as we discuss below.
A legislator or lobby proposing legislation for data protection or privacy will
most likely model it on one of the existing acts, the UPDPA or one of the
CAVACO statutes. In that event, we have specific recommendations for changes,
based on our normative model. Table 1 summarizes key characteristics of the
UPDPA and CAVACO statutes as they affect public health practices and
research; the entries in it that are highlighted in bold italic text are those that raise
concerns according to our normative frameworks.
1. Real and Perceived Barriers to Data Use for Public Health Practice
and Research
Evaluating the impact of a data protection law on secondary data use
requires acknowledging that both real and perceived data-use barriers exist. Data
protection laws impose real barriers when the text of the laws prohibits or
impedes (i.e., through complicated requirements or procedures) the use of data.
395 Letter from Cason Schmit et al., Faculty, Texas A&M University, to Harvey Perlman,
Chair, Drafting Committee, Collection and Use of Personally Identifiable Data Act, Uniform Law
Commission (June 6, 2021) (on file with authors).
396 Letter from Jane Bambauer, Professor of Law, University of Arizona, to Cason Schmit et
al., Faculty, Texas A&M University (July 6, 2021) (on file with authors).
397 Schmit et al., supra note 28, 83–86.

220

DATA PRIVACY IN THE TIME OF PLAGUE

For example, the UPDPA creates real data-sharing barriers for prohibited data
practices because the law expressly prohibits those activities.398 Similarly,
although FERPA technically does permit some public health uses of education
data by permitting the use of aggregate data or the use of personal data with the
express consent of all individuals,399 the utility deficiencies of aggregate data and
the practical difficulties associated with consent in big-data applications
effectively mean that FERPA poses real data sharing barriers to public health
data practices.400
Perceived data-sharing barriers are different because the language of the law
does not actually create a real barrier to secondary data practices. Instead,
barriers exist when controllers or processors believe a barrier does, or could,
exist. These perceived barriers are most likely to exist when data protection laws
are complex, lack specific language, or carry substantial penalties that encourage
hyper-conservative organizational practices. For example, HIPAA is often cited
as a data-sharing barrier when, in fact, it contains generous provisions permitting
research and public health activities.401
The vague definitions of protected data in these acts could also introduce
perceived barriers. The CAVACO statutes and the UPDPA all use
reasonableness to define protected data, which creates uncertainty for data
controllers that wish to share data for public health practice or research. With this
uncertainly, controllers will likely consider legal deidentification exceptionally
difficult to practically accomplish without a clear safe-harbor exception (i.e., like
the HIPAA regulations).
2.

Data Uses for Research

Provisions in data protection laws that permit data gathering where the
primary use is human subjects research regarding public health are beneficial to

398 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 9.
399 34 C.F.R. § 99.30 (2021).
400 ASS’N OF STATE & TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFS., PUBLIC HEALTH AND SCHOOLS TOOLKIT,
FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT, https://www.astho.org/advocacy/state-healthpolicy/legal-preparedness-series/public-health-and-schools-toolkit/?
[https://perma.cc/R5PMWDPH].
401 45 CFR 164.512 (b), (i) (2021); Steve Alder, Do HIPAA Rules Create Barriers That
Prevent Information Sharing?, HIPAA JOURNAL (Nov. 19, 2018), Error! Hyperlink reference not
valid.https://www.hipaajournal.com/hipaa-rules-barriers-to-information-sharing/
[https://perma.cc/F4ZK-BYVG]; see also 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, 130 Stat.
1033 (2016), where Congress made “information blocking” illegal for certain health data
applications to address restrictive organizational and technological practices that interfere with
legitimate data sharing. Had there been real legal barriers, Congress likely would have needed to
create or expand HIPAA data use provisions.

221

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

21:1 (2022)

the public.402 Data gathered particularly for public health research, including
health records, environmental conditions, and consumer behavior data, can help
public health professionals understand the causes of poor health and investigate
interventions that promote well-being.
All four statutes provide some protections for transparaency and autonomy
in research contexts. But there are also some impediments research makes
secondary uses of data.403 As Table 1 shows, the UPDPA and CAVACO statutes
exempt from their application data gathered for public health research according
to contemporary ethical principles. These provisions are beneficial from a public
health perspective because they do not add additional requirements on top of the
existing regulatory framework established by the already expansive federal
Common Rule.404
Where human subject research relies on secondary data, however, there are
some variations among these acts. As the second row of Table 1 shows, the
UPDPA and the California and Colorado statutes generally permit such uses. The
Virginia act, however, requires active consent before a data controller discloses
data for the secondary purpose of research. At a minimum, public health
researchers and professionals should seek to have research that is subject to the
Common Rule classified as disclosed favored data practices or as passive-consent
restricted data practices. The default on consent here is critical to ensuring that
data a controller provides to researchers is representative. Of course, researchers
will also have to satisfy IRBs that they are taking appropriate steps to protect data
subjects from harms associated with research. For states considering the UPDPA,
they should propose that Common Rule research be a “compatible data practice”
under the Act. If a state data privacy act entirely exempts research from its
application, controllers could in theory provide data to researchers without
disclosing the fact to data subjects at all; and that would prevent data subjects
having the right to opt out, either of the data practice or of a relationship with the
controller altogether. Given that active consent is a poor default where obtaining
consent for research is required, we urge public health researchers and
professionals to oppose such requirements in acts in other states, and we suggest
those in Virginia may want to seek an amendment to the Virginia act to correct
this default.

402 See generally Ramanathan et al., supra note 269.
403 Public health practices and data disclosures entirely within and among government
agencies are not covered. See supra Section II.D.
404 Common Rule, supra note 9.
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Table 1: Status of data practices relevant for public health under each act
(matters of concern for public health in highlighted text). “Favored” means that data may be
used for the purpose without consent; “restricted” that data may be used only with active consent
(opt-in) or with passive consent (chance to opt-out).

Human subjects research (HSR) 405
UPDPA
California
—HSR is
Act does
Act does not
primary use
not cover
cover activity
activity if
if data are
data are
collected for
collected
HSR
solely for
HSR
—HSR is
Act favors
Act does not
secondary
activity: no
cover activity
use
consent
if data are
required but disclosed for
must be
HSR
disclosed if
“routine”
Other public health activities
UPDPA
California
Public health
Act favors
surveillance
activity: no
consent
required but
Public health
must be
Act restricts
population
disclosed if
activity:
interventions
“routine”
permitted with
passive
Public health
Act restricts consent (optout offered).
individual
activity:
interventions
permitted
with active
consent
(opt-in
required)
for sensitive
data;
passive
consent for
all others

405

Subject to IRB/Common Rule, supra note 9.
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Virginia
Act does not
cover activity if
data are
collected for
HSR

Colorado
Act does not
cover activity
if data are
collected for
HSR

Act restricts
activity:
permitted only
with active
consent (opt-in
required)

Act does not
cover activity
if data are used
or shared for
HSR

Virginia

Colorado

Generally, act
restricts
activity:
permitted only
with active
consent (opt-in
required)
(Exception: If
HIPAA permits
the activity by
covered entities
for public
health and
public health is
the data’s
primary use,
Virginia act
does not cover
it.)

Act favors
activity: no
consent
required; no
disclosure
required
(subject to
certain
conditions)
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Data Uses for Public Health Practice

Provisions in data protection laws that permit secondary use of data for
public health practices are also beneficial to the public. Many factors beyond
biology, including social, environmental, and economic factors, determine an
individual’s health status.406 Traditional public health data sources consist mainly
of health records and surveillance data, such as reports of infectious diseases, but
the myriad of data protection laws have created both real and perceived barriers
to access data on many social, environmental, and economic factors.407 These
data are essential to fully leverage data to promote population well-being.408
Moreover, research data-use exemptions are often not sufficient for public health
activities that require swift action, such as surveillance for outbreak
investigations.
As Table 1 shows, the California and Colorado acts broadly support data
practices, primary and secondary, for all three categories of public health
activity: surveillance, population interventions, and individual interventions.
California restricts these activities, requiring notice and choice, but the choice is
via passive consent and thus opt-out. The Colorado statute provides broad
permission for data practices for “reasons of public interest in the area of public
health.”409 In Colorado, these activities are favored, requiring no consent or
disclosure to the data subject, provided those performing the activities meet the
statute’s requirements. Though supportive of public health, these provisions raise
concerns on normative grounds that they deny data subjects transparency and
autonomy. As a normative matter, we would prefer to see disclosure, which
would allow data subjects either to opt out of the data practice or choose not to
disclose data to the collecting controller in the first place. Public health
professionals in Colorado might seek a revision to that act to address this
concern.
The Virginia statute may have grave effects on the use of personal data for
public health practices, and the UPDPA may have such effects on the use of
sensitive personal data for public health practices. The Virginia act provides
significant impediments to all public health activities, as it permits them
generally only with active consent, requiring notice and opt in. (There is an
exception for HIPAA-covered entities using data for the primary purpose of
public health, but this is a narrow category.) The UPDPA favors data practices,
406 See Frieden, supra note 38; Galea et al., supra note 14.
407 Schmit et al., supra note 28, at 83–86; Braveman & Gottlieb, supra note 14, at 19–31.
408 Kum et al., supra note 217.
409 CPA, supra note 4, § 6-1-1304(3)(a)(xi) (2021).
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primary and secondary, for public health surveillance and population
interventions, requiring no consent but disclosure to the data subject. The
UPDPA requires active consent, however, for individualized interventions
involving sensitive data. When the default is to require active consent from the
data subject—an opt in—subjects are much less likely to agree to participate,
likely leaving public health efforts with spotty data that may be severely skewed
based on which data subjects do decide to opt-in. As sensitive data under the
UPDPA include sex, gender, etc., this problem may be particularly acute in
adopting states. Though these provisions value personal autonomy, they do so at
considerable danger to public health. Public health professionals in Virginia
should seek to modify its act to align it more closely with the other CAVACO
statutes and the UPDPA. They should also seek to modify the requirement for
active consent for public health uses of sensitive data so that they require only
passive consent.
Public health professionals may also seek a voluntary consensus standard410
to clarify that such interventions for public health are indeed compatible data
practices that do not require complicated consent. For example, one of the factors
that can be weighed when determining whether an activity is a compatible data
practice is whether the activity advances “the economic, health, or other interests
of the data subject.”411 Given that this is the goal of many public health
interventions, it is possible that many public health activities—even individual
interventions—could be permitted under the UPDPA’s factor-based definition for
compatible data practices. On the other hand, the UPDPA’s flexible, factor-based
approach to compatible data practices creates substantial uncertainty about public
health interventions that target specific individuals because of the absence of
express permissive language. There are thus opportunities to improve or clarify
the UPDPA rules to maximize data practices to promote population health. Some
public health data practices, particularly if they result in individualized
interventions and involve sensitive data, could be seen as restricted practices that
require active consent.
Public health professionals would thus be wise to seek provisions in a VCS
for practices that they want to be classified as favored. Such a VCS would greatly
facilitate the work of public health professionals and researchers. But
development of a VCS requires a critical mass of experts from the field,
representatives of consumer groups, and others. It will take time and money. On
the bright side, because the UPDPA calls for states to respect each other’s
judgments when approving VCSs, public health professionals need not create a
VCS for only one state. Rather, they can collaborate to develop a national
410 See supra Section II.G.
411 UPDPA, supra note 4, § 7(a)(6).
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standard with a hope that most or all the UPDPA states will adopt it and that the
CAVACO states and others modeling their legislation on CAVACO statutes
would amend their acts to come into conformity with the VCS.
Of course, the next step after developing a VCS is getting it accepted in the
UPDPA states. We suggest that public health professionals focus their efforts on
states with larger populations whose adoption will function to influence attorneys
general more strongly in other states to accept it. A strategic effort to seek early
adoption of the VCS in states with diverse political climates (e.g., some strongly
Democratic and some strongly Republican) may also make it easier to obtain
wider adoption by avoiding any apparent taint of partisanship.
The work of public health professionals is not over when the statutes and
VCSs are adopted. Key for public health professionals in California and the
UPDPA states is making sure that collecting controllers disclose proposed public
health uses of data. They need to persuade private-sector controllers who may be
their partners to provide notice in their privacy policies indicating they are
engaging in these activities. This is probably not a burdensome requirement
where private controllers are concerned, as the public health researchers and
professionals must generally form relationships with them to obtain data anyway.
In California and Virginia, collecting controllers that partner with public health
researchers and practitioners may need to add the means for consumers to opt out
or in for various proposed data practices. Similarly, if the UPDPA is adopted
without modification from ULC’s model, uses of sensitive data in individual
public health interventions will also require an opt-in mechanism. Public health
researchers and professionals in those jurisdictions would have to work with
private-sector partners to provide disclosure and probably some kind of incentive
to for data subjects to opt in.
In the UPDPA states where a VCS is adopted, controllers and processors
will still need to indicate that they are complying with the VCS in their privacy
policies so that public health uses can be considered “compatible” data practices
under the UPDPA. In states that model their statutes on the CAVACO acts,
further work may be necessary to ensure that private-sector controllers and
processors can comply with requests from public health researchers and
professionals to work with them.
CONCLUSION
Ideally, data privacy laws create restrictions to protect against risky or
harmful data practices while permitting socially desirable data practices.
Governmental and public interest in new privacy regulations is a reaction against
the existing U.S. privacy approach to this balance. To a great extent, the advent
of the UPDPA and CAVACO statutes may help to create the blanket of data
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privacy protection many have called for in recent years. For the most part, they
appear to cover those areas left uncovered by the long-standing patchwork of
data privacy protections. However, allowances for socially beneficial data uses in
new privacy regulations are just as critical. There are great opportunities in these
laws to extend and support public health practices and research under these
blankets. Public health professionals should be alert to legislative and regulatory
efforts, however, and engage with them to prevent restrictions that prevent public
health work for the public good.
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